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INTRODUCTION

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic devastated communities across
the United States. 1 The deadly disease infected approximately 20
million and killed more than 300,000 people as of December 31, 2020.2
In the same year, Joe Biden and Donald Trump competed in the
presidential election,3 while down the ballot, hundreds of politicians
competed in House, Senate, state, and local elections.4 In the months
leading up to Election Day, state officials struggled to implement safe

1. See Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10,
2021, 7:37 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-uscases.html [https://perma.cc/AY2R-XGQL].
2. See Cumulative Cases, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED. (Mar. 18, 2021, 6:00
AM), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/cumulative-cases [https://perma.cc/5DM87SS7].
3. See
Presidential
Election,
2020,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential_election,_2020
[https://perma.cc/5SE2-YSYL]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
4. See Congressional, State, and Local Elections, USA.GOV (July 21, 2021),
https://www.usa.gov/midterm-state-and-local-elections
[https://perma.cc/Q6E8FDAV].
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procedures to facilitate voting.5 Although the majority of U.S. citizens
have historically voted in person and on Election Day, 6 election
officials sought to provide alternative access to the ballot box while also
minimizing voters’ exposure to COVID-19. 7 In many states, these
changes included expanded access to absentee ballots and extended
early voting, resulting in record-breaking voter turnout in the 2020
general election.8
As a result of the November election, Democrat Joe Biden won the
presidency, and the Democrats maintained control of the House of
Representatives.9 Additionally, Democrats won 48 Senate seats, and
Republicans won 50 Senate seats.10 In Georgia, both Senate seats went
to runoff elections, which occurred on January 5, 2021.11 The runoff
elections determined the control of the Senate. 12 If the Republican
candidates won one or both of the seats, the Republicans would have
control of the Senate; 13 if the Democrats won both seats, the
Democrats would have control, with Vice President Kamala Harris

5. See Molly Ball, How COVID-19 Changed Everything About the 2020 Election,
TIME (Aug. 6, 2020, 6:45 AM), https://time.com/5876599/election-2020-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/9ZDC-77TF].
6. See Drew DeSilver, Amid Pandemic, the Long Decline of In-Person Voting on
Election Day Is Likely to Accelerate This Year, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/03/amid-pandemic-the-long-declineof-in-person-voting-on-election-day-is-likely-to-accelerate-this-year/
[https://perma.cc/3Z8U-ZEDD] (noting that in 1996, 89.5% of U.S. voters reported
casting a ballot in person on Election Day).
7. See Changes to Election Dates, Procedures, and Administration in Response
BALLOTPEDIA
to
the
Coronavirus
(COVID-19)
Pandemic,
2020,
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_election_dates,_procedures,_and_administration_
in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020
[https://perma.cc/N48T-T2GJ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
8. See Lazaro Gamio et al., Record-Setting Turnout: Tracking Early Voting in the
2020
Election,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/elections/early-voting-results.html
[https://perma.cc/ZV72-WDDN].
9. See Presidential Election, 2020, supra note 3; United States Congress Elections,
2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Congress_elections,_2020
[https://perma.cc/YVV8-3UGB] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
10. See United States Congress Elections, 2020, supra note 9.
11. See Naaman Zhou, Georgia Senate Runoff Elections: How They Work and
Why
They
Matter,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
4,
2021,
6:04
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/30/georgia-senate-runoff-electionsguide-how-they-work-why-they-matter [https://perma.cc/BA5K-DHH8].
12. See id. (“When there is a 50–50 tie, the deciding vote is cast by the vice
president. That will be Democrat Kamala Harris after the Biden administration is
sworn in on 20 January.”).
13. See id.
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casting the deciding vote.14 Control of the Senate was momentously
important for both parties. 15 A Democratic majority in the Senate
would enable then-President-elect Joe Biden to provide people muchneeded relief from COVID-19. 16 Alternatively, a Republicancontrolled Senate could block the Democratic agenda, just as it did
under President Barack Obama.17 Pollsters expected the elections to
be particularly close and hypothesized that a few hundred voters could
decide the fate of the Senate.18 In the end, both Georgia Democratic
Senators narrowly won, giving Democrats control over the Senate.19
For the November 2020 general election, Georgia’s Secretary of
State made significant efforts to facilitate early and absentee voting.20
For example, the state mailed every voter no-excuse absentee ballots
and placed absentee ballot drop-off boxes all across the state.21 This
resulted in unprecedented absentee voter turnout. 22 Additionally,
election administrators opened numerous early in-person polling sites
to reduce lines and crowding on Election Day, 23 producing record
voter turnout and showing that early voting was one of the few safe and
secure voting procedures for many voters.24
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Harry Enten, Why Georgia’s Senate Runoffs Are Too Close to Call,
CNN (Dec. 21, 2020, 7:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/21/politics/georgiarunoffs-analysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/QW3W-V3ET].
19. See
Georgia Senate Runoff Election Results, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/01/05/us/elections/results-georgiarunoffs.html [https://perma.cc/HPR6-EZRH] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
20. See Secretary of State Raffensperger Reopens Grants for Absentee Ballot
Drop
Boxes,
GA.
SEC’Y
STATE,
https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/secretary_of_state_raffensperger_reopens_gran
ts_for_absentee_ballot_drop_boxes [https://perma.cc/8PVU-CA87] (last visited Mar.
13, 2021).
21. See id.
22. See Haley Garrett, Georgia Secretary of State Reveals Record Breaking Early
Voting, Absentee Ballot Turnout, WGXA NEWS (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://wgxa.tv/news/local/georgia-secretary-of-state-reveals-record-breaking-earlyvoting-absentee-ballot-turnout [https://perma.cc/2UC4-B8LR].
23. See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, Fulton County Launches Massive Early Voting
GA.
PUB.
BROAD.
(Oct.
1,
2020,
2:14
PM),
Campaign,
https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/10/01/fulton-county-launches-massive-early-votingcampaign [https://perma.cc/8DJU-JSVN]; Olivia Morley, Board of Elections Firms Up
Locations for Early Voting and Weekend Voting, ROME NEWS-TRIB. (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.northwestgeorgianews.com/rome/news/local/board-of-elections-firms-uplocations-for-early-voting-and-weekend-voting/article_1c2ab2c6-fd06-11ea-9616b7ce91fe6cfa.html [https://perma.cc/TH8P-HZ4C].
24. See Garrett, supra note 22.
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Despite the pandemic worsening in the two months between the
general election and the runoff elections, Georgia election officials
attempted to eliminate no-excuse absentee voting 25 and restricted
access to early voting for the runoff elections.26 In Cobb County, for
the runoff elections, election administrators eliminated 6 of the 11 early
voting sites that serviced its 537,000 voters. 27 Yet, early voting was
especially important in Cobb County, where voters experienced some
of the longest early voting lines in Georgia during the general
election.28 Cobb County had initially planned to have nine early voting
sites but increased it to 11 after record-breaking in-person voter
turnout and extremely long lines at the start of early voting.29 Even
with 11 poll sites, voters waited as long as ten hours at early voting
sites.30
To ensure that Cobb County’s new poll closures for the runoff
elections did not inhibit marginalized voters from accessing the
franchise, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People Legal Defense and Education Fund (NAACP LDF) and other
civil rights groups sent an open letter on December 7 (December 7
Letter) to the county’s election officials.31 The letter asserted that the
poll site closures “disproportionately impact[ed] Cobb County’s Black
and Latinx voters and expose[d] Cobb County to litigation.”32 Three
of the closures were in South Cobb, where many Black and Latinx

25. See Michael King, Georgia Secretary of State Wants to Get Rid of No-Excuse
Absentee
Voting,
11ALIVE
(Dec.
28,
2020,
9:09
AM),

https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/georgia-secretary-of-statewants-to-get-rid-of-no-excuse-absentee-voting/85-ce5ace48-7b66-4fd5-b99ec522e0e0bf1c [https://perma.cc/Q8BC-JFRP].
26. See Vanessa Williams, Voting Rights Groups Alarmed After Cobb County
Cuts Half of its Early-Voting Sites for Ga. Senate Runoffs, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2020,
7:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/07/voting-rights-groupsalarmed-after-cobb-county-reduced-early-voting-sites-ga-senate-runoffs/
[https://perma.cc/AF4U-67W6].
27. See id.; infra appendix.
28. See Letter from NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., to Cobb Cnty.
Bd. of Comm’rs et al. 1, 2 (Dec. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Dec. 7 Letter],
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-Cobb-Cnty-re-Reduction-inAdvance-Voting-Locations-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG4R-RRNN].
29. See id.
30. See id. (citing Ken Tabous, Voters Wait Up to 10 Hours in Line to Vote in
Critical Georgia County, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 21, 2020, 4:58 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/voters-wait-10-hours-line-vote-critical-georgia-county1541132 [https://perma.cc/6SGQ-WJTP]).
31. See id.
32. Id. at 7.
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voters are concentrated.33 These early voting changes would make it
“difficult, if not impossible, for many Black and Latinx voters” to cast
their ballots before Election Day.34
Cobb County officials contended that they closed the polling sites
because they did not have enough poll workers due to COVID-19, the
holiday season, and the amount of work required. 35 However, the
December 7 Letter indicated that there were enough poll workers to
staff the early poll sites and offered to help train and recruit additional
poll workers. 36 As a result of mounting pressure, Cobb County
officials announced that they would add two early voting sites during
the final week of early voting and relocate another polling place to
South Cobb.37 Although the organizations welcomed the additional
poll sites, they also stated the response was “insufficient,” as Cobb
County continued to have near two-hour lines and some of the lowest
voter turnout in the state. 38 Importantly, one of the attorneys who
drafted the December 7 Letter observed that “[i]t wasn’t until there
was an overt threat of litigation did the county agree to take steps to
mitigate the situation.”39
Nationwide, voting rights advocates sent similar letters and threats
of litigation to protect vulnerable voter populations that did not have
the resources to litigate their own claims.40 However, recent Supreme

33. See id. at 4–7.
34. Id. at 5.
35. See Sanya Mansoor, Georgia Polling Site Closures Reducing Access to Early
Voting Among Working Class and Minority Voters, Civil Rights Groups Say, TIME
(Dec. 26, 2020, 6:29 PM), https://time.com/5923898/georgia-early-voting-polling
[https://perma.cc/QC9F-9FBR] (“In Cobb, elections director Janine Eveler said in a
statement ‘between COVID, the workload, and the holidays, we have simply run out
of people.’”).
36. See December 7 Letter, supra note 28, at 7.
37. See Mansoor, supra note 35.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Michael Pernick, an attorney for the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund).
40. See, e.g., December 7 Letter, supra note 28; 2020 Letters to Poll Workers and
Police Regarding Voter Intimidation at the Polls, ACLU CONN.,
https://www.acluct.org/en/2020-letters-poll-workers-and-police-regarding-voterintimidation-polls [https://perma.cc/R5DS-8CJX] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021);
Advocacy: Letters to Election Officials, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 23, 2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/advocacy-letters-electionofficials [https://perma.cc/KUC2-VELR]; Voting Rights, LAWS.’ COMM. FOR C.R.
UNDER
L.,
https://lawyerscommittee.org/project/voting-rights-project/
[https://perma.cc/54RX-W7PU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021) (“Through coordinated and
integrated programs of litigation, voter protection, advocacy, and education, the
Voting Rights Project has had a tremendous positive impact on communities of color,
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Court opinions indicate that the threat of litigation over election
administration decisions made close to Election Day will soon be moot,
even if the claims are meritorious.41
As a result of the copious changes to election laws made in response
to the pandemic, there was an unprecedented amount of litigation
during the 2020 election.42 The Supreme Court, heavily relying on its
2006 ruling in Purcell v. Gonzalez, 43 gave great deference to state
legislatures to administer the 2020 election.44 This Note explores how
the Supreme Court has taken the actual text of the Purcell opinion and
morphed it into the Purcell principle, a bright-line rule against judicial
intervention in elections close to Election Day. 45 This principle is
based on a desire to prevent voter confusion or upset expectations
regarding the rules of an election.46 Reliance on the Purcell principle
creates a gap in judicial protections on the right to vote and leaves the
door open for abuses of state power.47
This Note examines the Court’s application of the Purcell principle
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, this Note identifies the
implications the combination of Purcell and the state emergency
powers doctrine pose to future elections.
Part I explains the Purcell principle by (1) exploring the Court’s
initial decision in Purcell and (2) examining how courts applied the
Purcell principle in subsequent cases. Part I then discusses executive
emergency powers in constitutional and state law, examines examples
of recent emergencies affecting elections, and summarizes actions
states and cities have taken to combat the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s reliance on Purcell during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Part II explains the intersection of state
emergency powers and cases applying the Purcell principle that arose
during the 2020 general election. Part II illustrates that the Purcell
low-income communities, youth, people with disabilities, and other traditionally
disenfranchised populations.”).
41. See infra Section II.D.
42. See Election Litigation: COVID-19 and Emergency Election Litigation, FED.
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/350168/covid-19-and-emergency-electionlitigation [https://perma.cc/FU7J-SCXP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
43. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.
44. See infra Part II.
45. See David Gans, The Roberts Court, The Shadow Docket, and the Unraveling
of Voting Rights Remedies, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 19 (2020), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/Purcell-Voting-Rights-IB-Final-Version.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D3HK-RT2R]; Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle,
43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (2016); supra Section I.A.ii.
46. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 435.
47. See infra Part III.
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principle is inconsistently applied by lower courts and leaves a gap in
voting rights protections.
Part III then calls on the Supreme Court to clarify the bounds of the
Purcell principle to allow for consistent lower-court application.
Furthermore, Part III shows the imminent potential for abuse of state
emergency powers through a hypothetical scenario. Finally, for
challenges to election laws during an emergency, Part III proposes a
new framework that would allow plaintiffs to make a showing of
egregious abuse of state emergency powers through an
unconstitutional manipulation of electoral processes. This Note
concludes by applying this new framework to a hypothetical scenario,
demonstrating why the Supreme Court must overcome the Purcell
principle and state emergency powers.
I. THE PURCELL PRINCIPLE AND STATE EMERGENCY POWERS

The development of the Purcell principle over the last two decades
and its deviation from the process for evaluating preliminary requests
for relief are crucial to understanding its application during the
COVID-19 pandemic. This Part summarizes the scope of state
emergency powers and gives examples of how the Supreme Court
analyzed cases regarding emergency powers in the past. Additionally,
this Part covers recent emergencies affecting elections and the use of
state emergency powers to address risks associated with COVID-19.
This Part also details both the Purcell principle and state emergency
powers to provide essential context to understanding how combining
these two concepts is problematic for future emergencies.
A. Judicial Analysis of Election Laws and the Purcell Principle

Election law jurisprudence developed over decades as the Supreme
Court’s understanding of the right to vote and freedom of association
expanded.48 As the Court’s conceptualization of election law evolved,
so did the administration of elections.49 This Section summarizes the
development of the Purcell principle and demonstrates its effect on
judicial evaluation of election laws close to Election Day.

48. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KHAN & RICHARD H. PILES,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5th ed.
2016).
49. See Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx
[https://perma.cc/PZ8G-PAKC].
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i. Jurisprudence Surrounding Election Laws and Requests for
Preliminary Relief
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,50 the Supreme Court stated, “the political
franchise of voting . . . is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because [it is] preservative of all rights.”51 Generally, laws that infringe
on fundamental rights receive strict scrutiny.52 Between the 1960s and
1980s, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard to laws that infringed
on fundamental rights.53 However, in Anderson v. Celebrezze54 and
Burdick v. Takushi, 55 the Court limited its use of strict scrutiny in
election law cases. The Supreme Court devised the Anderson-Burdick
test to balance the competing interests of the individual’s right to vote
against the State’s justifications for burdening the right to vote with the
challenged regulation.56
In Burdick, the Court held that, in considering election regulations,
a court must first consider “the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”57 If the court deems the burden
“severe,”58 then strict scrutiny — not the Anderson-Burdick standard
— is applied.59 If not, then the court must (1) “identify and evaluate
the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule”; (2) “determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests”; and (3) “consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s

50. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
51. Id. at 370.
52. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“We
have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under
the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must
be closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”).
53. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969);
Harper, 383 U.S. at 670.
54. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
55. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
56. Compare Harper, 383 U.S. at 789, with Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. For example,
a photo identification law is a burden on the right to vote and a state may argue that a
justification for this burden is to protect against voter fraud. See Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 200–01 (2008).
57. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
58. Compare Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198–200 (characterizing a photo identification
requirement to vote as not severe given that most voters already possess the requisite
identification), with Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000)
(finding that a California statute severely burdened political parties’ right to associate
when it forced them to allow voters to vote in their primaries who were not registered
with the party).
59. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
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rights.” 60 Modern courts use the Anderson-Burdick test to analyze
election laws that plaintiffs claim burden their right to vote under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.61
Many election law cases concern requests for preliminary
injunctions or temporary restraining orders (TROs) to prevent the
enforcement of a challenged procedure before an upcoming election.62
When district courts evaluate requests for preliminary injunction or
TROs, they weigh four factors: whether (1) the plaintiff has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the plaintiff is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the
balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction is
in the public interest.63 The most important factors in this analysis are
the first and the second: the likelihood of success on the merits and the
irreparable harm to the plaintiff absent preliminary relief. 64 When
courts assess a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits of an
emergency relief request, they use the Anderson-Burdick test to weigh
the burden on the individual’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
against the state’s justifications for burdening those rights. 65 Then,
based on these factors, the court may issue preliminary relief.66
If a district court grants the plaintiff’s requested preliminary
injunction or TRO, the defendant may appeal for a stay pending
appeal.67 A stay pending appeal prevents the preliminary injunction
from going into effect before a full appeal is heard.68 A stay is part of
the “traditional equipment for the administration of justice” and allows
an appellate court the necessary time to review a lower court’s order.69
The Supreme Court characterized a stay as an “‘intrusion into the
ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,’ and

60. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
61. See Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of Two Election Law Standards, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/a-tale-of-two-electionlaw-standards/ [https://perma.cc/K8TJ-Q8GA].
62. See Gans, supra note 45, at 18.
63. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
64. See id. at 20–21.
65. See, e.g., Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2020); Org. for
Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603, 607–08 (8th Cir. 2020).
66. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.
67. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009).
68. See id. at 426–27.
69. See id. at 427.
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accordingly ‘is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might
otherwise result to the appellant.’”70
Typically, the issuance of a stay is left to the court’s discretion and
depends on the facts of each case.71 When examining a stay, courts
consider the Nken factors:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is
likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will
substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.72

The Nken factors are similar to those for issuing a preliminary
injunction “because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may
allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action
has been conclusively determined.”73 If the district court issues a stay,
it is essentially dispositive for the outcome of an election law case
because the appellate court usually renders a final judgment on the
merits after Election Day. 74 The only chance for an appellant to
overturn a stayed order is by appealing to the Supreme Court;
however, the Court would only vacate the stay if the lower court
“demonstrably” erred in its application of “accepted standards.”75

ii. How Purcell Altered the Preliminary Injunctive Relief Analysis
The Purcell opinion changed how courts evaluate requests for
preliminary relief and stays pending appeal when an election date is
approaching. In Purcell, the petitioners filed for a preliminary
injunction of an Arizona referendum that required individuals to show
photo identification as proof of citizenship for voter registration and to
cast in-person ballots on Election Day.76 The trial court denied the
injunction and did not issue findings of fact or a legal conclusion.77 The
petitioners filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit, which issued a four70. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958); and then quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926)).
71. See id. at 433.
72. Id. at 434.
73. Id.
74. See Gans, supra note 45, at 16 (“In voting rights and other election law cases,
the decision to grant a stay may, for all intents and purposes, be outcomedeterminative, at least for the current election cycle.”).
75. See Hasen, supra note 45, at 433 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 571 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
76. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 1–2 (2006).
77. See id. at 3.
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sentence opinion enjoining Arizona’s law pending full hearings.78 The
district court then denied the request for a preliminary injunction.79
The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s order.80 In its analysis, the Court underscored three
essential elements that the Ninth Circuit should have considered. 81
First, the Court stressed that the Ninth Circuit “was required to weigh,
in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an
injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own
institutional procedures.”82 Next, the Court emphasized that judicial
orders close to Election Day might create voter confusion, especially
when courts issue conflicting orders. 83 Lastly, although the Ninth
Circuit issued its injunction before the district court’s opinion, the
Court asserted that the court of appeals should have given deference
to the district court.84 In its final sentence, the Court emphasized the
importance of the election’s timing and “the inadequate time to resolve
factual disputes.”85
The Purcell opinion added a special consideration into the analysis
for preliminary injunctions and stay considerations for election law: the
proximity of the election.86 While the Purcell opinion initially deviated
only slightly from the procedure for analyzing preliminary injunctions
or stay proceedings,87 subsequent cases morphed it into the doctrine
known today as the “Purcell principle.”88

iii. The Development of the Purcell Principle Through the “Shadow
Docket”
In Purcell, the Court instructed that special considerations be taken
into account when a court considers judicial intervention before an
election.89 Nowhere in its opinion did the Court articulate a hard-andfast rule mandating that courts never intervene when Election Day is

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id.
See id. at 3–4.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 4–5.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
See id.
See Hasen, supra note 45, at 440–44; supra Section I.A.i.
See Hasen, supra note 45, at 447–52.
See Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5–6.
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close at hand. 90 Rather, the Court merely stated that the closer an
election is, the greater the risk that court orders will increase voter
confusion, 91 and cautioned courts that the proximity of the election
should be a factor “in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance
or nonissuance of an injunction.” 92 Between 2006 and 2014, the
Supreme Court cited Purcell in four majority opinions,93 only one of
which stood for the proposition that “practical considerations
sometimes require courts to allow elections to proceed despite pending
legal challenges.” 94 Although the Purcell principle was not utilized
extensively during this period, nonetheless, in 2014, the Supreme Court
relied on the actual text of the Purcell opinion and morphed it into the
Purcell principle: a bright-line rule against intervening in elections
close to Election Day.95
The Court developed the Purcell principle exclusively through its
summary orders process. 96 The summary orders process, otherwise
known as the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket,” refers to emergency
and summary decisions outside of the Court’s main docket of cases.97
The summary orders process is characterized by expedited hearings
and hastily decided cases without full briefing.98 These cases are then
decided with little to no explanation of their rulings. 99 Thus, the
Court’s development of the Purcell principle through the summary
orders process provides a weak jurisprudential foundation for the
doctrine.100
In the 2014 election cycle, the Supreme Court applied the Purcell
principle in four cases through the summary orders process. These

90. See id. at 5.
91. See id. at 4–5.
92. Id. at 4; see also Hasen, supra note 45, at 439.
93. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013); John Doe
No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008).
94. Riley, 553 U.S. at 426.
95. See Gans, supra note 45, at 10–15.
96. See id. at 3, 10–15.
97. See Mark Walsh, The Supreme Court’s ‘Shadow Docket’ Is Drawing Increasing
Scrutiny,
AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Aug.
20,
2020,
9:20
AM),
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/scotus-shadow-docket-draws-increasingscrutiny [https://perma.cc/B6KZ-BPD5].
98. See Gans, supra note 45, at 15.
99. See id. In contrast, the Court’s normal adjudication process is lengthy and
meticulous with briefings from both sides and amici. See id.
100. See id. at 16.
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cases come from four different states: Ohio, 101 North Carolina, 102
Wisconsin, 103 and Texas. 104 The Court decided these cases without
issuing accompanying opinions. Despite the Court not providing
reasoning and issuing these decisions close to Election Day,105 lower
courts have subsequently cited these cases as applying Purcell. 106
These cases are also cited by scholars as cementing the Purcell principle
in election law jurisprudence.107 Two of the four cases are especially
illustrative of how the Supreme Court applied the Purcell principle in
the 2014 election cycle.
In 2014, the Court relied on the Purcell principle in Frank v. Walker
when it vacated the stay of a preliminary injunction of Wisconsin’s
voter ID law. 108 In Frank, the district court ruled that Wisconsin’s
voter ID law violated the U.S. Constitution.109 It held that not only did
approximately 300,000 Wisconsin voters not have the proper
identification to meet the ID requirement but also that these voters had
no easy way of obtaining such identification, putting the requirement
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 110 and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 111 Thus, it
issued an injunction of the ID requirement.112 Wisconsin appealed for
a stay of the order, which the Seventh Circuit granted.113
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and vacated the stay,
restoring the district court’s injunction of Wisconsin’s voter ID law.114

101. See Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014) (mem.).
102. See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014)
(mem.).
103. See Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014) (mem.).
104. See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.).
105. The 2014 general election took place on November 4, 2014. See United States
Congress
Elections,
2014,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Congress_elections,_2014
[https://perma.cc/N2XW-XGZY] (last visited Mar. 21, 2021).
106. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2020);
Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2020); Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y
of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016); Tex. Voters All. v. Dall. Cnty., No. 4:20CV-00775, 2020 WL 6146248 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2020); Eason v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Elections, No. 16-CV-4292, 2016 WL 11706706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016).
107. See, e.g., Gans, supra note 45, at 10–12. See generally Hasen, supra note 45, at
447–56.
108. See Frank, 574 U.S. 929.
109. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 879 (E.D. Wis. 2014).
110. See id. at 862–63.
111. See id. at 870.
112. See id. at 897–900.
113. See Frank v. Walker, 766 F.3d 755, 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
114. See Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929, 929 (2014) (mem.).

2021]

ABUSING EMERGENCY POWERS

981

The Court offered no justification for its order, which it issued slightly
less than a month before Election Day.115 Justice Alito dissented from
the Court’s decision to vacate the stay but conceded “the proximity of
the upcoming general election” was a “colorable basis” for the Court’s
action.116 Although the Purcell opinion is not a bright-line rule, it was
the only Supreme Court precedent at the time that stood for the
principle that the Court should not intervene close to an Election
Day.117 Here, Justice Alito clearly stated that the majority’s decision
was based on the proximity of the election.118
That same year, the Court again relied on the Purcell principle in
Veasey v. Perry. 119 In Veasey, the petitioners alleged that Texas’s
voter ID requirement violated the Constitution because it
unconstitutionally burdened minority and indigent voters.120 In an 81page opinion, the district court held that the state intentionally
discriminated against minorities in violation of the Voting Rights
Act 121 and the Equal Protection Clause. 122 The Fifth Circuit then
stayed the order and allowed Texas to use the voter ID law in the 2014
election.123 In its stay, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas was likely
to succeed on the merits because the district court’s stay was issued
prior to the election.124 Looking at the Supreme Court’s prior orders
from this cycle,125 the Fifth Circuit deduced that the Purcell principle
applied in cases brought so close to the election.126
The petitioners asked the Supreme Court to vacate the stay, but the
Court refused without explanation. 127 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
115. See id.
116. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Article III — Equitable Relief — Election
Administration — Republican National Committee v. Democratic National
Committee, 134 HARV. L. REV. 450, 457 (2020) (citing Frank, 574 U.S. at 929).
117. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2006).
118. See Frank, 574 U.S. at 929.
119. 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.); see also Hasen, supra note 45, at 428 (finding that
the Veasey Court applied the Purcell principle).
120. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633–34 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
121. See id. at 694 (citing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
122. See id. at 657–58. A Texas Representative admitted that “it was ‘common
sense’ . . . that minorities were going to be adversely affected by [the voter
identification law].” Id. at 702.
123. See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014).
124. See id. at 895.
125. See id. at 894–95 (first citing Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014) (mem.); then
citing North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 574 U.S. 927 (2014) (mem.);
and then citing Husted v. Ohio State Conf. of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014)
(mem.)).
126. See Veasey, 769 F.3d at 894.
127. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.).
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wrote a dissent criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s application of the Purcell
principle.128 She highlighted the extensive factual record the trial court
based its decision upon, to which the Fifth Circuit gave almost no
deference. 129 Justice Ginsburg noted that this was in direct
contradiction of the Purcell opinion.130 She declared that the majority
and the Fifth Circuit had relied on the potential disruption to Texas’s
election processes, despite a showing that the state implemented the
law with the intent to disenfranchise minority voters.131
Although the Court did not explain its reasoning, lower courts cite
Frank and Veasey when ruling on election laws close to Election
Day.132 The Court used the summary orders process as the primary
vehicle to develop the Purcell principle, deciding these cases without
full briefing or consideration.133 Nowhere in the Purcell opinion did
the Court assert a hard-and-fast rule that courts should never intervene
close to Election Day. 134 Nevertheless, through these rulings in its
“shadow docket,” the Court has transformed the Purcell principle into
a bright-line rule.135
B. The State Emergency Powers Doctrine and
Its Relevance to Election Law

This Section explores federal and state emergency powers and
discusses state emergency lawmaking in the context of election law.
This Section then focuses on emergency situations impacting elections
prior to 2020. Lastly, this Section summarizes state actions taken in
response to COVID-19.

128. See id. at 10–12 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 10.
130. See id. (“Purcell held only that courts must take careful account of
considerations specific to election cases, not that election cases are exempt from
traditional stay standards.” (internal citation omitted)).
131. See id. “The greatest threat to public confidence in elections in this case is the
prospect of enforcing a purposefully discriminatory law, one that . . . risks denying the
right to vote to hundreds of thousands of eligible voters.” Id. at 12.
132. See Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Off., 843 F.3d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 2016);
Taylor v. Milwaukee Election Comm’n, 452 F. Supp. 3d 818, 828 (E.D. Wis. 2020);
Eason v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 16-CV-4292, 2016 WL 11706706, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016).
133. See Gans, supra note 45, at 3.
134. See id. at 9.
135. See id. at 15–18.
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i. Emergency Powers in Constitutional Law
Emergency powers refer to state and federal government’s
heightened authority to respond to specific threats to public safety and
welfare. 136 For example, the Constitution delegates power to the
federal government to deal with specific emergencies such as war,
insurrection, and domestic violence. 137 Congress has the power to
declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy,
and call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union. 138 The
President is the commander-in-chief of the military.139 Furthermore,
each state has its own powers and statutes that deal with
emergencies. 140 The Supreme Court interprets federal emergency
powers very broadly in times of emergency, such as during war.141 This
is known as the “state emergency powers doctrine,” which holds that
governments have increased power to address foreign and domestic
emergencies.142 However, after the emergency is over, the Court rolls
back its extreme deference to the federal government and states.143 On
this point, acclaimed political scientist Clinton Rossiter once said,
“[t]here do[es] indeed seem to be two Constitutions — one for war,
one for peace.”144 The Court’s actions during the Civil War and World
War II exemplify this,145 as these two wars encapsulate the most drastic
use of emergency powers by the federal government.146 The radical
actions taken during these emergencies parallel those taken to combat
the COVID-19 pandemic in their scope and impact on everyday life in
the United States.

136. See A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 1
(2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201910/2019_10_15_EmergencyPowersFULL.pdf [https://perma.cc/E82E-Q5S6].
137. See William B. Fisch, Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the United
States, 38 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 389, 390 (1990).
138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
139. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
140. See Legislative Oversight of Emergency, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar.
18, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-oversightof-executive-orders.aspx [https://perma.cc/3BYF-LT56].
141. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96. See generally CLINTON ROSSITER, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (expanded ed. 1976).
142. See Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine,
62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 76–84 (1983).
143. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96.
144. ROSSITER, supra note 141, at 129.
145. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96; see also ROSSITER, supra note 141, at 11–
130.
146. See L. ELAINE HALCHIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS
5 (2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/98-505.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VK8-DEST].
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During the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally declared a
general martial law, proclaiming that government military tribunals
would try and punish all persons “guilty of any disloyal practice
affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United
States.”147 Lincoln also suspended the writ of habeas corpus without
congressional authorization, citing “public necessity.” 148 Lincoln
waited three months after declaring martial law and suspending the
writ of habeas corpus to request ratification of his actions, and it took
Congress two years to ratify them. 149 During the war, the Supreme
Court did not consider whether Lincoln exercised valid government
power. 150 For example, in 1864, at the peak of the war, the Court
refused to hear a case of a civilian who was convicted by a military
tribunal, claiming it did not have appellate jurisdiction over military
tribunals.151
Only after the Civil War did the Court review the federal
government’s actions during the war. One year after the war ended, in
Ex parte Milligan,152 the Court reviewed a habeas corpus petition from
a civilian convicted by a military tribunal in a non-rebellious area
during wartime. 153 Then, it emphasized the inability of courts to
adequately consider emergency powers during the war:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not
allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a
correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. . . . Now that the
public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others, can be
discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any
element not required to form a legal judgment.154

The Court reversed the conviction and criticized the executive
branch under Lincoln’s unfettered use of military tribunals and martial
law during the Civil War. 155 As a result of the Court’s ruling, the
jurisdiction of military tribunals is limited to members of enemy forces

147. Fisch supra note 137, at 412 (quoting VI J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 98 (1897)).
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 394–95.
151. See generally Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
152. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
153. See id. at 107–08.
154. Id. at 109.
155. See id. at 121–27.

AND
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during wartime.156 Military tribunals are unique in constitutional law
in that they are exempt from certain amendments in the Bill of
Rights.157 The Court reasoned that when civilian courts were open and
able to hear cases and the person tried is a civilian who is not involved
in military service, Lincoln’s executive war powers did not sanction the
use of a military tribunal as a forum to try a civilian unconnected with
the rebellion. 158 The Court thus determined that the government
denied Milligan his constitutional right to a trial by jury, as he was not
in military service. 159 The Court stressed the importance of
safeguarding individual rights and liberties, even in times of war and
emergency.160
Going further, the Court rebuked the executive branch’s actions and
vehemently opposed the idea that the government can declare general
martial law. 161 Then, it emphasized the potential for abuse by
subsequent administrations.162 The Court stated that “[w]icked men,
ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may
fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right
is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to
human liberty are frightful to contemplate.”163 Although during the
Civil War, the Court did not review the federal government’s
actions, 164 after the emergency ended, the Court vigorously rejected
the power of the government to impose martial law and restricted the
power of the executive branch during wartime.165
Similarly, during World War II, the Court deferred to the Executive
during an emergency but then admonished the government
156. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., COMPARISON OF RIGHTS IN
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS AND TRIALS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL COURT 10 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40932.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JM2-ZXCA].
157. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (a grand jury indictment is not required “in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger”). The Supreme Court also held that the Sixth Amendment’s
right to trial by jury and right to counsel do not apply to the military justice system. See
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 42–48 (1976).
158. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121–22. The Court was expressly referring to
the military commissions set up by Lincoln during the Civil War and not the suspension
of habeas corpus. See id.
159. See id. at 122–23.
160. See id. at 123–24.
161. See id. at 125–26. “Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure
together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must
perish.” Id. at 125.
162. See id. at 125.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 125–26.
165. See id. at 126–27.
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afterward. 166 For example, the Court unanimously upheld the
imposition of a curfew that solely applied to those of Japanese
ancestry. 167 The Court ruled that “Congress and the Executive are
[not] wholly precluded from taking into account those facts and
circumstances which are relevant to measures for our national defense
and for the successful prosecution of the war, and which may in fact
place citizens of one ancestry in a different category from others.”168
Although the Court acknowledged the reprehensible nature of a racebased law, it ruled that the federal government was justified because of
the wartime emergency.169
Then, in Korematsu v. United States,170 the Supreme Court held that
the decision to exclude Japanese Americans from military areas during
the war was constitutional.171 The Court concluded that the executive
branch had the power to remove Japanese Americans from their
homes, even without suspicion of sabotage or disloyalty.172 Although
there were clear sentiments of racial prejudice in the order and its
administration,173 the Court stated that the exclusion was justified by
purely military objectives.174
However, just after World War II concluded, the Court retracted its
deferential decisions in Duncan v. Kahanamoku. 175 Similar to
Milligan, Kahanamoku questioned the constitutionality of the
conviction of a civilian by a military tribunal established under martial
law.176 After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii declared martial law,
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved shortly thereafter in
compliance with the Hawaiian Organic Act. 177 Military police
subsequently arrested Duncan and White for crimes that were not
connected with military service.178 At the time of their arrests, civilian
courts were open.179 The Court therefore reversed their convictions

166. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 395.
167. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104–05 (1943).
168. Id. at 100.
169. See id. at 100–01.
170. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
171. See id. at 215–19.
172. See id. at 217–19.
173. See id. at 216.
174. See id. at 223–24.
175. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
176. See id. at 307.
177. See id. at 307–08.
178. Duncan was arrested for getting into a brawl with two military sentries and
White was arrested for embezzling. See id. at 309–11.
179. See id. at 326–27.
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and ruled that, under Milligan, the exercise of emergency powers to
replace civilian courts, capable of hearing cases, with military tribunals
for civilians not connected to military service is unconstitutional.180 In
its rebuke of emergency military powers, the Court declared that “[t]he
established principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone
govern; and to it the military must always yield.”181
During times of emergency, the Court is extraordinarily deferential
to the federal government.182 During wartime emergencies, the Court
(1) declined to consider whether the calling of general martial law and
the conviction of civilians by military tribunals were constitutional183
and (2) upheld a race-based curfew as well as race-based exclusion
orders. 184 After the emergencies ended, the Court held that such
actions were unconstitutional. The Civil War and World War II are
examples of how the Court used the emergency powers in the past.

ii. When Emergencies Impact Elections
Prior to 2020, there were no modern precedents for nationwide
emergencies affecting national elections.185 However, there are recent
examples of state emergencies that coincided with elections. 186
Furthermore, in times of emergency, state officials can use heightened
authority to respond.187 On September 11, 2001, two planes struck the
Twin Towers as New Yorkers were heading to the polls for a primary

180. See id. at 324.
181. Id. at 323 (quoting Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879)).
182. See Fisch, supra note 137, at 394–96. An example of the use of emergency
powers outside of wartime is the drastic measures taken by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to respond to the Great Depression. See Belknap, supra note 142, at 70–76.
183. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864).
184. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). It is unclear how
much of the Court’s deference came from the allocation of constitutional authority
over foreign affairs to Congress and the Executive, however this Note does not focus
on this topic.
185. See R. SAM GARRETT, SARAH J. ECKMAN & KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., COVID-19 AND OTHER ELECTION EMERGENCIES: FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS
AND
RECENT
POLICY
DEVELOPMENTS
12–13
(2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46455/2
[https://perma.cc/8NB5MAC3].
186. See id. at 4–9.
187. See Election Emergencies, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 1, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JKK6-H27W]. State officials’ heightened emergency powers in
regard to elections include suspending or amending statutes, postponing the election,
and relocating polling places among other things. See id.
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election.188 Within hours of the attack, then-Governor George Pataki
issued an executive order delaying the primary.189 Two days later, the
New York State Legislature passed the Emergency Primary Election
Rescheduling Act, which postponed the primary until September 25.190
September 11 may be the most traumatic emergency affecting an
election in recent U.S. history, but it is not the only one.191
The most common triggers for state emergency powers near an
election are hurricane related. 192 Hurricane season runs from June
through November 193 and has substantially impacted elections for
decades.194 For example, the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections were
affected by hurricanes. On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy ravaged
the eastern seaboard of the United States just seven days before the
presidential election on November 6.195 Twenty four states were hit,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency issued disaster
declarations for 225 counties in ten states.196 The majority of states that
were severely affected by Hurricane Sandy did not provide substantial
opportunities to vote by mail or vote early before Election Day.197 A

188. See Adam Nagourney, After the Attacks: The Election; Primary Rescheduled
for Sept. 25, with Runoff, If Necessary, Set for Oct. 11, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2001),

https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/14/us/after-attacks-election-primary-rescheduledfor-sept-25-with-runoff-if-necessary.html [https://perma.cc/M8N6-34H2].
189. See Adam Nagourney, A Day of Terror: The Elections; Pataki Orders
Postponement of Primaries Across State, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/day-terror-elections-pataki-orderspostponement-primaries-across-state.html [https://perma.cc/MPD8-BR9U].
190. See GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185, at 8; see also 2001–12: Effect of New York

State Legislature Decision to Reschedule New York State Primary and Runoff
Elections,
N.Y.C.
CAMPAIGN
FIN.
BD.
(Sept.
20,
2001),

https://www.nyccfb.info/law/advisory-opinions/2001-12-effect-new-york-statelegislature-decision-reschedule-new-york-state/ [https://perma.cc/3TFE-MGE2].
191. See GARRETT ET AL. , supra note 185, at 4–9.
192. See id.
193. See Tropical Cyclone Climatology, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/climo/ [https://perma.cc/X9N6-DAM9] (last visited Mar. 6,
2021).
194. See Adam Howard, How Hurricanes Have Disrupted and Defined Past
Elections,
NBC
NEWS
(Oct.
6,
2016,
2:26
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/hurricane-matthew/how-hurricanes-havedisrupted-defined-past-elections-n660796 [https://perma.cc/6HJM-TZKZ]; Meredith
McGraw, A Look Back at How Hurricanes Affect Presidential Elections, ABC NEWS
(Oct. 7, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/back-hurricanes-affectpresidential-elections/story?id=42643749 [https://perma.cc/N3G5-AGVC].
195. See Robert M. Stein, Election Administration During Natural Disasters and
Emergencies: Hurricane Sandy and the 2012 Election, 14 ELECTION L.J. 66, 66 (2015).
196. See id.
197. See id. at 67–68. Maryland was the only state affected by Hurricane Sandy to
implement early in-person voting in 2020. See id.

2021]

ABUSING EMERGENCY POWERS

989

significant number of polling places were damaged by the hurricane
and remained closed due to flooding. 198 In response, many state
legislatures failed to provide voters with flexible solutions to vote, such
as absentee voting or the option to vote early.199 As a result, in the 225
impacted counties, voter turnout declined by 2.8% on average between
2008 and 2012.200 Ultimately, Hurricane Sandy was one of the most
disruptive hurricanes in terms of impact on an election.201
Hurricane Matthew created a similar problem in early October
2016. 202 Several states declared emergencies in preparation for
Hurricane Matthew and ordered widespread evacuations of the
coastlines.203 Hurricane Matthew hit on October 7, four days before
the end of voter registration in Florida on October 11. 204 ThenGovernor Rick Scott refused to extend the voter registration deadline
in Florida despite calls from voting rights groups to accommodate
voters displaced by the hurricane.205 The Florida Democratic Party
and other groups filed suit, alleging that refusing to extend the voter
registration had a “decidedly partisan effect.” 206 The district court

198. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Disruption from Storm May Be Felt at the Polls,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/03/us/politics/hurricanesandy-threatens-to-disrupt-voting-on-election-day.html
[https://perma.cc/99QGKNT9].
199. See Stein, supra note 195, at 68–69.
200. See id. at 69.
201. See GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185, at 5–6.
202. See Tai Kopan, Hurricane Matthew Hits Campaign Trail with Voter
Registration
Deadline
Fight,
CNN
(Oct.
7,
2016,
1:43
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/07/politics/hurricane-matthew-politicsvoting/index.html [https://perma.cc/GAX5-TER8].
203. See Reuters, 4 States Declare Emergency as Hurricane Matthew Closes in on
Florida, FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2016, 4:10 AM), https://fortune.com/2016/10/07/hurricanematthew-florida-emergency-evacuate/ [https://perma.cc/GFQ7-TPU7] (noting that
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina declared states of emergency
ahead of Hurricane Matthew).
204. See Hannah Hartig & John Lapinski, Will Hurricane Matthew Impact Voter
(Oct.
7,
2016,
1:54
PM),
Registration
in
Florida?,
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/will-hurricane-matthew-impactvoter-registration-florida-n661976 [https://perma.cc/U98V-XME6].
205. See id. During the 2016 presidential election, Rick Scott also served as the
National Chairman of Rebuilding America Now, which supported Donald Trump in
the election. See Sally Bronston, Gov. Scott on Trump’s Tax Returns: ‘Every
Candidate’s
Different,’
NBC
(Aug.
7,
2016,
12:25
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/gov-scott-trump-s-tax-returns-everycandidate-s-different-n624851 [https://perma.cc/GGQ2-SVMZ].
206. Joseph Ax, Judge Gives Florida Voters More Time to Register After
Hurricane, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2016, 11:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-election-florida-registration/judge-gives-florida-voters-more-time-to-register-
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ordered the Governor to extend the voter registration deadline by six
days. 207 Hurricane Matthew was the last hurricane to interrupt an
election prior to 2020.208

iii. State Responses to COVID-19
Emergency situations, like the hurricanes discussed above, grant
state and federal officials greater power to address the emergency. In
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many state officials utilized
emergency powers.209 On January 31, 2020, then-Secretary of Health
and Human Services Alex M. Azar II declared a public health
emergency for the entire country. 210 Then on March 13, President
Donald Trump invoked his emergency presidential powers under the
National Emergencies Act.211 Additionally, all 50 states declared their
own states of emergency. 212 State responses to COVID-19 varied
widely, but the vast majority took extraordinary steps to combat the
deadly virus. 213 They implemented various emergency procedures
such as stay-at-home orders, criminal and civil sanctions for large
gatherings, and mandates to wear facial masks.214 These emergency
actions impacted nearly every aspect of life in the United States, from

after-hurricane-idUSKCN12C1Y2 [https://perma.cc/Z9SQ-G4EA] (quoting a
complaint filed by the Florida Democratic Party against the State of Florida).
207. See id.
208. Other examples of hurricanes affecting elections include Hurricane Andrew in
1992, Hurricane Charley in 2004, and Hurricane Matthew in 2018. See generally
GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185.
209. For an in-depth analysis on each state’s response to COVID-19, see State
Action on Coronavirus (COVID-19), NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-action-on-coronavirus-covid19.aspx#dataViz [https://perma.cc/AS25-T2BC].
210. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Health and Hum. Servs., Secretary Azar
Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan.
31, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31/secretary-azar-declares-publichealth-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/6Z6T-E6BB].
211. See Proclamation 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337 (Mar. 18, 2020). Section 319 of the
Public Health Service Act grants the President emergency power, among other things,
to release funds to state and local governments to combat the health emergency as well
as suspend incoming international travel to the United States. See Public Health
Service Act § 319, 42 U.S.C. § 247d.
212. See Oren Gross, Emergency Power in the Time of Coronavirus . . . and Beyond,
JUST SEC. (May 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/70029/emergency-powers-in-thetime-of-coronaand-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/ZX2R-NQNE].
213. See State Action on Coronavirus (COVID-19), supra note 209.
214. See id.
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simple activities like hanging out with friends to complex matters like
the economy.215
There are four general categories of gubernatorial emergency
power.216 In many states, the governor has power over state election
laws during an emergency.217 Specifically, 45 states have statutes and
contingencies for dealing with emergencies on Election Day.218 These
statutes vary greatly from state to state, but most constitute three
categories of powers.219 These three categories grant (1) the power to
delay or reschedule an election,220 (2) the power to relocate polling
places,221 and (3) the power to delay or reschedule an election.222 In
addition, many states allocate emergency authority to governors to
suspend or amend statutes.223 A federal statute sets out the date for all
federal elections, and governors do not generally have the power to
postpone such elections in an emergency.224 The only instance of this
occurred in 2018 when Super Typhoon Yutu hit the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the Governor postponed the election for House Delegate
from November 6 to November 13.225
In response to COVID-19, many states implemented or expanded
voting procedures during the 2020 election cycle.226 The vast majority
of states allowed voters to cast a ballot by mail, many without needing
to cite a reason such as disability, physical incapacity, or others. 227
States also expanded access to early in-person voting to reduce the
crowding on Election Day, and thus the potential to spread COVID-

215. See Most Americans Say Coronavirus Outbreak Has Impacted Their Lives,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/03/30/mostamericans-say-coronavirus-outbreak-has-impacted-their-lives/
[https://perma.cc/9GB9-U82R].
216. See Election Emergencies, supra note 187 (providing a breakdown of each
gubernatorial power by state in table 2).
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Six states — Idaho, Kentucky, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah —
provide for a delay or rescheduling of the election. See id.
221. Eighteen states allow for the relocation of polling places. See id.
222. Six states — Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, Maryland, South Carolina, and
Virginia — allow for delaying the election and relocating polling places. See id.
223. See id.
224. See 2 U.S.C. § 7; GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185, at 5.
225. See GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185, at 5.
226. See Absentee and Mail Voting Policies in Effect for the 2020 Election, NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/absentee-and-mail-voting-policies-in-effect-for-the-2020-election.aspx
[https://perma.cc/4LBW-88LR] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020).
227. See id.
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19.228 Early and absentee voting saw record numbers of voters,229 and
these expansions facilitated historic voter turnout in the 2020
presidential election. 230 Additionally, 19 states postponed their
primaries. 231 In times of emergency, government officials have
expanded authority to protect U.S. residents, even during an election.
Many state government officials used such authority during the 2020
election in response to COVID-19.
II. REQUESTS FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF FROM
ELECTION LAWS DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Part II discusses the ways the Supreme Court examined challenges
to election procedures during 2020. Section II.A demonstrates the
Court’s willingness to defer to states early in the pandemic. This
Section further explains how members of the Court incorporated the
state emergency powers doctrine in their analyses along with the
Purcell principle. Section II.B examines how lower courts utilized the
Purcell principle throughout the 2020 election. Section II.C then
covers how the usage of the Purcell principle leaves a gap in voting
rights protections by analyzing an example from the 2021 Georgia
Senate runoff elections.
A. The Application of the Purcell Principle
During the COVID-19 Pandemic

The following cases demonstrate how the Supreme Court applied
the Purcell principle early in the COVID-19 pandemic. In Republican
National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (RNC), the
Court established the initial framework for applying the Purcell
principle during the pandemic.232 Merrill v. People First of Alabama
shows how the Court applied the principle after RNC. 233 Both of these
cases set the stage for future cases, which ultimately combined the
228. See Richard H. Pildes, Early and Mail-In Voting for 2020 Election Expands
Dramatically Despite Legal Fights, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2020, 6:00 AM),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/early-and-mail-in-voting-for-2020-election-expandsdramatically-despite-legal-fights-11604052000 [https://perma.cc/2HJJ-DZBK].
229. See Gamio et al., supra note 8.
230. See Kevin Schaul, Kate Rabinowitz & Ted Mellnik, 2020 Turnout Is the
Highest in Over a Century, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2020, 4:29 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/voter-turnout/
[https://perma.cc/BLK6-574D].
231. See GARRETT ET AL., supra note 185, at 11.
232. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207
(2020) (per curiam).
233. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.).
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reasoning initially set forth in RNC with the state emergency powers
doctrine.

i. Republican National Committee v. Democratic National
Committee

On March 24, 2020, Wisconsin Governor Tony Evers issued a stayat-home order to stem the spread of COVID-19. 234 Wisconsin’s
primary was scheduled for April 7, only 14 days later. 235 The
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and other parties sued the
Wisconsin Elections Commission in federal court to postpone the
primary election.236 The DNC asserted that Wisconsin residents would
face “the extreme burden of literally risking their health and lives in
order to cast a vote.” 237 Wisconsin citizens overwhelmed election
officials with requests for absentee ballots, which thousands of voters
would not receive until after Election Day because the election offices
could not process them in time.238 Yet, the district court denied the
DNC’s petition to postpone the election.239 Instead, the court issued a
preliminary injunction extending the deadline by which absentee
ballots could be received by up to six days past Election Day, even if
the ballot was not postmarked by Election Day.240
On April 6, in RNC, 241 the Supreme Court relied on the Purcell
principle to stay the district court’s order.242 The Court, referring to
the issue as a “narrow, technical” one, stated that extending the
deadline for when absentee ballots may be cast was an extraordinary
departure from the plaintiff’s requested relief and “fundamentally
alter[ed] the nature of the election.”243 The Court criticized the district
court for crafting its own relief when it granted the extension of the
234. See Wisc. Exec. Order No. 12 (Mar. 24, 2020).
235. See Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their Health
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2020),
and
Their
Civic
Duty,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html
[https://perma.cc/P6WK-WWQ4].
236. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann I), 451 F. Supp. 3d
952, 958 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
237. Id. at 970–71 (quoting the plaintiff’s brief).
238. See id. at 962 (“[T]he City Clerks for Madison and Milwaukee represent that
‘[t]here is no practical way that a person submitting a request for an absentee ballot on
the deadline for submitting the request . . . will have the time to receive, vote and return
their ballot by Election Day.’” (alteration in original) (quoting the defendant’s brief)).
239. See id. at 975.
240. See id. at 975–83.
241. 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per curiam).
242. See id.
243. Id. at 1206–07.
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receipt of absentee ballots and elimination of the postmark
requirement.244
The majority applied the Purcell principle and relegated its
discussion of the COVID-19 pandemic to just one line in the opinion.245
The Court stated that it “ha[d] repeatedly emphasized that lower
federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve
of an election.” 246 However, this was not an ordinary situation.
Hundreds of polling places were closed to prevent COVID-19 from
spreading.247 For example, Milwaukee closed 175 out of 180 polling
places.248 With only five locations, Wisconsinites who voted in person
waited in long lines and increased their chances of catching the
airborne virus.249 Additionally, thousands of Wisconsin voters did not
receive their absentee ballots on time.250 Thus, the Court’s decision
forced thousands of voters to choose between not voting and risking
exposure to the deadly COVID-19 virus to vote in person.251 Justice
Kagan dissented, emphasizing that the “suggestion that the current
situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an ordinary election’
boggles the mind.” 252 The dissent also noted that “[e]nsuring an
opportunity for the people of Wisconsin to exercise their votes should
be [the Court’s] paramount concern.”253

ii. Merrill v. People First of Alabama
After RNC, the Supreme Court applied the Purcell principle to
other cases challenging ballot access and voting requirements. On July
244. See id. at 1207.
245. See id. at 1208 (“The Court’s decision on the narrow question before the Court
should not be viewed as expressing an opinion on the broader question of whether to
hold the election, or whether other reforms or modifications in election procedures in
light of COVID–19 are appropriate.”).
246. Id. at 1207.
247. See Henry Redman, Wisconsin’s Closed Polls, WIS. EXAMINER (Apr. 6, 2020),
https://wisconsinexaminer.com/2020/04/06/wisconsins-closed-polls/
[https://perma.cc/5ASB-VFK4].
248. Id.
249. Elise Viebeck et al., Long Lines, Anger and Fear of Infection: Wisconsin
Proceeds with Elections Under Court Order, WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2020, 6:40 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/long-lines-form-in-milwaukee-as-wisconsinproceeds-with-elections-under-court-order/2020/04/07/93727b34-78c7-11ea-b6ff597f170df8f8_story.html [https://perma.cc/LT4H-KV54].
250. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann I), 451 F. Supp. 3d
952, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
251. See Viebeck et al., supra note 249.
252. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 1211.

2021]

ABUSING EMERGENCY POWERS

995

2, 2020, in Merrill v. People First of Alabama, the Court stayed an
injunction of Alabama’s witness requirement for absentee ballots.254
In Merrill, the petitioners challenged Alabama’s requirement that
absentee ballots include a photocopy of valid photo ID and be signed
by a notary or two witnesses, claiming it would potentially force voters
to be exposed to COVID-19. 255 The district court held that the
challenge was warranted, and the plaintiffs were right to be concerned
about COVID-19 exposure.256 Thus, it enjoined the enforcement of
the absentee ballot requirements.257 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
unanimously refused to stay the order and agreed that the photo ID
and witness requirements were unconstitutional due to concerns over
COVID-19. 258 The concurring opinion addressed, but refused to
apply, the Purcell principle, stating the burden of implementation was
slight because it only forced the state to accept absentee ballots under
“relatively minor expanded circumstances.” 259 In her concurrence,
Judge Britt Grant expressed her concerns, stating that “[t]he Supreme
Court has emphasized time and time again that federal courts should
not jump in to change the rules on the eve of an election.”260
On review, the Supreme Court voted 5–4 to grant a stay of the
injunction, but it offered no opinion explaining its reasoning,261 making
it hard to determine why it ruled this way. However, Alabama’s
Republican primary runoff election was 12 days after the ruling, 262
which, coupled with the lower courts’ reliance on Purcell, indicates that
the Court likely relied on the Purcell principle. This is characteristic of
the Supreme Court’s other requests for emergency relief that applied
the Purcell principle. 263 Merrill is exemplary of how the Supreme

254. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.).
255. See People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1195–96 (N.D. Ala.
2020).
256. See id. at 1209.
257. See id. at 1225–27.
258. See People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505 (11th Cir.
2020).
259. Id. at 514 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 516 (Grant, J., concurring) (citing Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020)).
261. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.).
262. The Alabama primary runoff election took place on July 14, 2020. See United
States Senate Election in Alabama, 2020 (July 14 Republican Primary Runoff),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_Senate_election_in_Alabama,_2020_(July_14_
Republican_primary_runoff) [https://perma.cc/V8QS-KE5R] (last visited Mar. 6,
2021).
263. See supra Section I.A.
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Court addressed election law cases related to COVID-19 throughout
the 2020 election cycle.
RNC and Merrill are two of the Supreme Court’s COVID-19related election law cases during the 2020 election and illustrate how
the Court considered these cases early in the pandemic. 264 RNC
significantly strengthened the Purcell principle, allowing lower courts
to cite it as doctrine throughout the 2020 election.265 The Court stated
that it has “repeatedly emphasized” that courts not alter election rules
close to Election Day. 266 The Court implicated Purcell through
opinion-less orders in cases like those in 2014,267 but it never explicitly
directed lower courts not to intervene in elections close to Election
Day until RNC.268
B. The Combination of the Purcell Principle and the State
Emergency Powers Doctrine

As more cases made their way through the judicial system in 2020,
the Supreme Court not only relied on the Purcell principle but also
deferred to state power over election law and state emergency powers
more generally, which include, for example, the power to protect public
health and wellness by limiting First Amendment rights.269 Members
of the Court applied the state emergency powers doctrine in Andino v.
Middleton270 and Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State
Legislature 271 to justify deferring to the state legislatures’ decisions
regarding election administration during the COVID-19 pandemic.
264. See generally Clarno v. People Not Politicians Or., 141 S. Ct. 206 (2020) (mem.)
(staying an injunction of Oregon’s requirement to gather signatures to place initiatives
on the general election ballot); Raysor v. DeSantis, 140 S. Ct. 2600 (2020) (mem.)
(staying an injunction of Florida’s law forcing reconstituted felons to pay their fines in
order to regain voting rights under the Purcell principle); Tex. Democratic Party v.
Abbott, 140 S. Ct. 2015 (2020) (mem.) (denying a request to vacate a stay of an
injunction of Texas’s law automatically granting absentee ballots to citizens 65 or
older).
265. One hundred and sixteen cases cited RNC during the 2020 election. See, e.g.,
Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566, 568–69 (6th Cir. 2020); Mi
Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2020); Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d
608 (7th Cir. 2020).
266. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207
(2020) (per curiam).
267. See supra Section I.A.
268. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.
269. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mem.).
270. 141 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
271. 141 S. Ct. 28, 30 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also id. at 32 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring).
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Andino and Wisconsin State Legislature thus couple these two
doctrines to strengthen the Court’s position on COVID-19 election law
cases.272

i. Andino v. Middleton
Andino, similar to Merrill, concerned a witness requirement for
absentee ballots. 273 South Carolina’s absentee ballots mandated
another individual witness a voter’s signature on the absentee ballot
envelope.274 After plaintiffs cited “the unique risks presented by the
COVID-19 pandemic,” the district court found that the witness
requirement violated the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 275 The Fourth Circuit initially stayed the district court’s
order,276 but upon rehearing en banc, vacated that order.277 On review,
the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s opinion and, like Frank
and Veasey, 278 issued no majority opinion. 279 Justice Kavanaugh’s
concurring opinion laid out two reasons for granting the stay.280
First, Justice Kavanaugh reiterated a point Chief Justice Roberts
made in a different COVID-19 case, South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom: 281 “[T]he Constitution ‘principally entrusts the
safety and the health of the people to the politically accountable
officials of the States.’”282 Justice Kavanaugh asserted that this logic
extended to election laws, which “should not be subject to secondguessing by an ‘unelected federal judiciary,’ which lacks the
background, competence, and expertise to assess public health and is
not accountable to the people.” 283 Second, Justice Kavanaugh
emphasized the Court’s precedent, explicitly citing Purcell and stating
that federal courts should not alter state election rules close to the

272. See Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 10; Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–30
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–33 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
273. See Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 267 (D.S.C. 2020).
274. See id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-15-420 (2006).
275. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 294.
276. See Middleton v. Andino, No. 3:20-cv-20-2022, 2020 WL 5739010 (4th Cir. Sept.
24, 2020).
277. See Middleton v. Andino, 976 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
278. See supra Section I.A.iii.
279. See Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020).
280. See id. at 10 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
281. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (mem.).
282. Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 10 (quoting South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S.
Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
283. Id. (quoting South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1614).
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election. 284 This was the first time a Supreme Court Justice
conjunctively used the Purcell principle and the state emergency
powers doctrine in a holding.285

ii. Democratic National Committee v. Wisconsin State Legislature
Justice Kavanaugh applied this same line of reasoning 21 days later
in his concurring opinion in Democratic National Committee v.
Wisconsin State Legislature, 286 which involved a challenge to
Wisconsin’s deadline for receiving valid absentee ballots. 287 The
district court granted the petitioners relief in the form of a six-day
extension of the deadline for receipt of ballots, so long as the ballots
had postmarks dated by Election Day.288 The Seventh Circuit stayed
the district court’s injunction on two grounds: (1) the district court
changed the election’s rules too close to the election, and (2) its ruling
usurped the legislature’s authority to administer elections. 289 The
Seventh Circuit cited Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Andino to
support its decision.290
The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s stay on October 26, 2020,
eight days before the presidential election on November 3.291 Justice
Kavanaugh emphasized the importance of the Purcell principle and
went so far as to refer to it as “a basic tenet of election law.”292 He
reiterated that judicial restraint prevents voter confusion, as well as
confusion in election administration.293 Justice Kavanaugh added that
“[i]t is one thing for state legislatures to alter their own election rules
in the late innings . . . . It is quite another thing for a federal district
court to swoop in and alter carefully considered and democratically
enacted state election rules when an election is imminent.”294
Justice Kavanaugh then emphasized federal courts’ limited role in
COVID-19-related election cases.295 He argued that the Constitution
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
287. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann II), 488 F. Supp. 3d
776, 783–84 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
288. See id. at 817.
289. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann (Bostelmann III), 977 F.3d 639,
641–43 (7th Cir. 2020).
290. See id. at 642.
291. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28.
292. Id. at 31 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
293. See id.
294. Id. (emphasis added).
295. See id. at 32.
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provides “politically accountable state legislatures, not unelected
federal judges, with the responsibility to address the health and safety
of the people during the COVID-19 pandemic.” 296 Again, Justice
Kavanaugh stressed that the federal judiciary should not second-guess
a state legislature’s decision. 297 He noted the difference in state
responses to the challenges posed by holding an election during
COVID-19 and that it was the responsibility of each state’s legislature
to address such challenges.298
Justice Gorsuch argued that the district court in Wisconsin State
Legislature used COVID-19 to circumvent the state’s expressly
delegated power to run elections. 299 In his opinion, he faulted the
district court for substituting the state legislature’s judgment with its
own, violating the legislature’s expressly delegated constitutional
powers. 300 Justice Gorsuch underscored the legislature’s political
accountability and expertise in dealing with science and safety matters,
which he felt were better mechanisms for dealing with COVID-19related problems.301 He claimed that courts damage the people’s faith
in the Constitution by acting to usurp the legislature’s role in
elections.302 While not relying on the nearness of the election, Justice
Gorsuch still underscored the power of state legislatures to write
election laws, as opposed to the courts, as his reason for affirming the
stay.303

iii. Moore v. Circosta
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, relied on the same
reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Moore v. Circosta,304 decided two
days after Wisconsin State Legislature. He stated that, “[e]veryone
agrees . . . that the North Carolina Constitution expressly vests all

296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 32–33. To emphasize how hastily written this opinion was, it is worth
pointing out that it contained several errors. See Mark Joseph Stern, Let’s Count All
the Errors and Lies in Brett Kavanaugh’s Defense of Voter Suppression, SLATE (Oct.
27, 2020, 4:17 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/10/brett-kavanaugh-votersuppression-wisconsin-mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/Q5N7-489G].
299. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
300. See id. at 29 (“The Constitution provides that State legislatures — not federal
judges, not state judges, not state governors, not other state officials — bear primary
responsibility for setting election rules.”).
301. See id.
302. See id. at 30.
303. See id. at 29.
304. 141 S. Ct. 46, 47 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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legislative power in the General Assembly, not the Board or anyone
else.”305 Justice Gorsuch then cited his concurrence in Wisconsin State
Legislature to reiterate the legislature’s preeminence in administering
elections during COVID-19.306
Lastly, it is important to note that neither Justice Kavanaugh nor
Justice Gorsuch went through the traditional framework for staying
orders or vacating a stay of lower courts in these cases. 307 Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurrence in Andino ignored the Nken factors308 and
relied solely on the Purcell principle and state emergency powers.309 In
Wisconsin State Legislature, he did not consider any of the factors
required for evaluating whether to vacate the Seventh Circuit’s stay.310
Similarly, in his Wisconsin State Legislature concurrence, Justice
Gorsuch relied solely on the accountability of the legislature and the
Constitution’s explicit delegation to states to administer elections.311

iv. Looking Back at RNC and Merrill
The Court’s first COVID-19 election law case, RNC, lacked the state
emergency powers justification and relied solely on the election’s
proximity. 312 The majority characterized the case as a “narrow,
technical question.”313 The dissent argued, “[w]ith the majority’s stay
in place, . . . [voters] will have to brave the polls, endangering their own
and others’ safety. Or they will lose their right to vote, through no fault
of their own.”314 At least 52 people were infected with COVID-19 as
a result of voting in person in the Wisconsin primary election.315 The

305. Id. at 47.
306. See id.
307. See generally Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
308. See supra Section I.A.i.
309. See Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 9.
310. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40. For discussion of the factors for
evaluating whether to vacate a stay, see Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical
Health Servs. v. Abbott, 571 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring).
311. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–30.
312. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207
(2020).
313. Id. at 1206.
314. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
315. See Scott Bauer, 52 Who Worked or Voted in Wisconsin Election Have
COVID-19,
ABC
NEWS
(Apr.
29,
2020,
7:03
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/52-worked-voted-wisconsin-election-covid19-70406317 [https://perma.cc/5MW7-ZPQ3].
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voter confusion and difficulty in implementing court orders close to the
date of the election triumphed, in the Court’s eyes, over the confusion
and fear of voters the pandemic caused.316
The concurring opinions in Andino and Wisconsin State Legislature
may be reactions to RNC.317 Justice Kavanaugh weighed the tension
between the power expressly delegated to the states to run elections
and the states’ power to address public health crises against the courts’
power to remedy harms to voters’ rights. 318 Meanwhile, Justice
Gorsuch was primarily concerned with lower courts supplanting the
constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures’ power over
election administration and deferred to state legislatures’ decisions
regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.319
Looking at Merrill through this lens changes the context of the
Supreme Court’s order. 320 The Court potentially took the view —
although it is hard to be certain without a written opinion — that the
Alabama legislature considered the risks associated with COVID-19
and weighed it against the integrity of the election. The legislature then
affirmatively decided not to change the witness requirement for
absentee ballots and, according to the Court, this must be given
deference under the state emergency powers doctrine in addition to the
Purcell principle.321 This deference comes despite the burden on the
right to vote that the witness requirement poses in light of the COVID19 pandemic.322 Thousands of Alabamans voted by mail and requiring
a witness to sign the ballots potentially exposed them to COVID-19.323
Justice Kavanaugh did not write an opinion in Merrill, but he may have

316. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1205–08 (majority opinion).
317. See generally Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
318. See Andino, 141 S. Ct. at 9 (2020); Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 30–40.
319. See Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. at 28–30 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
320. See Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (mem.).
321. See supra Section II.B.
322. See, e.g., Yelena Dzhanova, Some Voters Are Scared the Coronavirus Will
Stop Them from Casting a Ballot, CNBC (June 1, 2020, 4:01 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/01/some-voters-are-scared-coronavirus-will-stop-themfrom-casting-ballot.html [https://perma.cc/M5P6-7FTN].
323. See Madeleine Carlisle & Abigail Abrams, The Supreme Court’s Alabama
Ruling Could Disenfranchise Thousands of High Risk Voters, TIME (Oct. 23, 2020,
3:45
PM),
https://time.com/5903449/supreme-court-restricts-voting-alabama/
[https://perma.cc/XSH7-WAXM].
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evaluated Andino similarly.324 Without an opinion to accompany the
order in Merrill, it is impossible to tell exactly how the Court
considered it. Nevertheless, the addition of the state emergency
powers doctrine and legislature’s power over election administration
to the Purcell principle adds a stronger justification to the Court’s
reasoning in these cases.
C. Lower Court Usage of the Purcell Principle

During the 2020 election cycle, over 70 district courts cited either the

Purcell opinion or the Purcell principle’s explication in RNC. 325

Circuit courts stayed a preliminary injunction or refused to grant one
and sided with the state in nearly every one of the 30 appealed
decisions. 326 The majority of circuit courts relied on the Purcell
principle in their ultimate conclusions.327 Only four appellate courts
sided with the plaintiffs because the state either settled,328 offered no
legal resistance, 329 or filed its appeal too late for relief. 330 One
appellate court sided with the plaintiffs only to be reversed by the

324. Compare People First of Ala., 467 F. Supp. 3d at 1191–97, with Middleton v.
Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271–76 (D.S.C. 2020).
325. For a search of cases citing Purcell v. Gonzalez during the 2020 election, see
WESTLAW, https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “549 U.S. 1”; follow the “Citing
References” hyperlink; filter cases by date from Jan. 1, 2020 to Dec. 31, 2020 and nonSupreme Court Cases). For a search of cases citing Republican Nat’l Comm. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. during the 2020 election, see WESTLAW,
https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “140 S. Ct. 1205”; follow the “Citing References”
hyperlink; filter cases by non-Supreme Court Cases).
326. See, e.g., Esshaki v. Whitmer, 813 F. App’x 170, 171–73 (6th Cir. 2020) (ruling
that a political candidate’s ballot access was unconstitutionally burdened because he
would have to gather signatures in violation of a stay-at-home order, but staying the
preliminary injunction in part because it overrode the state’s power to administer
elections); Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 2020) (refusing
to grant a temporary restraining order on Tennessee’s absentee ballot procedures,
which plaintiff alleged were treated differently than mail-in ballots in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
327. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2020);
Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 618 (7th Cir. 2020); New Ga. Project v. Raffensperger,
976 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020).
328. See Common Cause R.I. v. Gorbea, 970 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020) (rejecting an
intervening motion by Republican Party organizations for stay because defendants
settled with plaintiffs).
329. See Libertarian Party of Ill. v. Cadigan, 824 F. App’x 415 (7th Cir. 2020)
(allowing the preliminary relief to stand because the defendants originally consented
to the court order but then later filed appeal to stay the injunction).
330. See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 977 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2020)
(refusing to stay a preliminary injunction of absentee ballot procedures because the
appeal was filed after absentee voting began).
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Supreme Court. 331 Two of these cases arose after Election Day on
November 3, 2020, 332 which is patently different than when an election
is imminent. The courts applied a bright-line rule to these cases and
failed to consider them on the merits. 333 Many of these cases were
highly politicized, with both the Republican and Democratic parties
initiating or intervening in the majority of cases.334
The circuit courts showed enormous deference to the state
justifications when applying the Nken factors. 335 As noted above,
almost none of the cases sided with plaintiffs when considering a stay
pending appeal absent other unique considerations. 336 The circuit
courts weighed the interests of the state in administering the election
during COVID-19 extraordinarily heavily when balancing the stay
factors.337 Although these cases applied the Purcell principle, it was
not consistently applied in the same manner among the circuit
courts. 338 Some cases applied the Purcell principle under the
“likelihood of success on the merits” factors.339 Other cases applied
the Purcell principle when considering whether the state would be
irreparably harmed absent a stay of the preliminary injunction.340 Still,
others applied it when considering the balance of equities or public
331. See People First of Ala. v. Sec’y of State for Ala., 815 F. App’x 505 (11th Cir.
2020), vacated, Merrill v. People First of Ala., 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020).
332. See Bognet v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., 980 F.3d 336 (3d. Cir. 2020); Trump
v. Wis. Elections Comm’n, 983 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2020).
333. Compare Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 16–17 (1st Cir. 2020), with Mi
Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 862 (5th Cir. 2020), and Tully v. Okeson,
977 F.3d 608, 612–13 (7th Cir. 2020).
334. See generally Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct.
1205 (2020) (per curiam); Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 16–17 (noting the decision
only appealed by intervening Republican Party, which sought to overrule settlement
between plaintiffs and election officials).
335. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2020)
(deferring specifically to the state legislature’s emergency powers to run elections);
Tully, 977 F.3d at 615–16 (applying rational basis review instead of the AndersonBurdick test when assessing the appellants likelihood of success on the merits).
336. See, e.g., Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745 (6th Cir. 2020) (staying a
preliminary injunction of ballot-access requirements for third-party candidates would
require plaintiffs to violate stay-at-home orders); Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs,
976 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2020) (staying a preliminary injunction of the elimination of
straight-ticket voting).
337. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 811–12 (6th Cir. 2020); Tully, 977
F.3d at 615–16.
338. Compare Tex. All. for Retired Ams., 976 F.3d at 568, with A. Philip Randolph
Inst. of Ohio v. Larose, 831 F. App’x 188, 192 (6th Cir. 2020), and Common Cause R.I.,
970 F.3d at 17.
339. See Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 863 (5th Cir. 2020); Tex. All.
for Retired Ams., 976 F.3d at 568.
340. See Tex. Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 411–12.
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interest factors. 341 There is confusion as to the Purcell principle’s
application, and the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance contributed to
the variation in the circuit courts’ reasoning. This line is particularly
blurred when court orders will actually lessen voter confusion.342 Some
circuit court decisions helped to prevent voter confusion, which was the
primary consideration in the Purcell opinion.343 The circuit courts did
not uniformly apply the Purcell principle, which can confuse plaintiffs
bringing claims against election laws close to the date of an election.344
D. A Confusing, Gaping Hole in Voting Rights Protections

The current application of the Purcell principle and state emergency
powers doctrine relinquishes the Supreme Court’s role in adjudicating
requests for preliminary relief from election laws.345 By refusing to
rule on the merits in emergency relief cases, the Court has retracted
judicial protections of the right to vote. This reasoning moves away
from a balancing test and towards a strict rule that, close to elections,
grants state legislatures full control over election laws, subject to little
to no substantive judicial review.346 Lower courts are following the
Supreme Court’s lead and using a bright-line rule based on the
proximity of the elections.347 This Note does not argue that all of these
cases are incorrectly decided, but rather that the bright-line rule against
intervening in election procedures close to Election Day prevents
courts from deciding these claims on the merits and permits
constitutional abuses.
An example from Georgia’s 2021 Senate runoff elections
underscores the importance of this. In Hall County, officials opened
several early voting locations for the 2020 general election to

341. See Larose, 831 F. App’x at 192; Org. for Black Struggle v. Ashcroft, 978 F.3d
603, 609 (8th Cir. 2020); Thompson, 959 F.3d at 813.
342. See Common Cause R.I., 970 F.3d at 17 (“[I]n the absence of the consent
decree, it is likely that many voters will be surprised when they receive ballots, and far
fewer will vote.”).
343. See id. (“Because of the unusual — indeed in several instances unique —
characteristics of this case, the Purcell concerns that would normally support a stay are
largely inapplicable, and arguably militate against it.”).
344. See infra Section III.A.
345. See Joshua A. Douglas, Courts Are Supposed to Protect the Right to Vote.
Why
Aren’t
They?,
CNN
(Oct.
14,
2020,
7:51
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/opinions/courts-not-protecting-voting-rightsdouglas/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9RL-CERP].
346. Compare Section I.A.i (explaining the Anderson-Burdick balancing test), with
Part II (exploring the use of the Purcell principle’s bright-line rule against judicial
intervention).
347. See supra Section II.B.
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accommodate COVID-19 concerns.348 Murrayville Library was one of
eight early voting sites opened to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and
ensure compliance with social distancing guidelines.349 In Gainesville,
Black and Latinx workers at the Fieldale Farms poultry plant relied on
the Murrayville Library, which was just a four-minute drive away, to
vote in the 2020 general election. 350 However, with the COVID-19
pandemic growing exponentially worse in December 2020, the
Murrayville Library and the three other sites were closed ahead of the
2021 Georgia Senate runoff elections.351
Georgia law, which mandates that citizens have two hours to vote on
their lunch breaks,352 and limited public transportation caused Fieldale
Farms workers to rely on nearby polling places to vote.353 These four
poll site closures disproportionately affected working-class Black and
Latinx voters like those at the Fieldale Farms plant, potentially forcing
them to vote on Election Day and expose themselves to COVID-19.354
In response, LatinoJustice and other public interest organizations
wrote a letter to Hall County election officials warning them that its
early voting site closures would make it “difficult, if not impossible, for
many Latino and Black voters” in Hall County to cast their ballots
before Election Day.355 The letter went on to say that the “elimination
of half of Hall County’s advance voting locations disproportionately
impact[ed] Hall County’s Latino and Black voters and expose[d] Hall
County to litigation.”356
The letter supported this assertion with direct evidence of decreased
voter turnout in Hall County for the runoff elections.357 Over the first
two days of early voting in the 2020 general election, Hall County was
among Georgia’s counties with the highest voter turnout. 358 In

348. See Mansoor, supra note 35.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-404 (West 2021).
353. See Mansoor, supra note 35.
354. See id.
355. Letter from Kira Romero-Craft, Managing Att’y, LatinoJustice PRLDEF et al.,
to Richard Higgins, Chairman, Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs et al. 4 (Dec. 16, 2020)
[hereinafter Dec. 16 Letter], https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/December16-2020-Letter-Re-Closure-of-Early-Vote-Sites-in-Hall-County.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8F3-TJCD].
356. Id.
357. See id. at 2.
358. See
id. (citing Voter Absentee Files, GA. SEC’Y STATE,
https://elections.sos.ga.gov/Elections/voterabsenteefile.do
[https://perma.cc/G65KD2LL] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021)).
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contrast, for the runoff elections, Hall County dropped to among the
counties with the lowest voter turnout over the first two days of early
voting.359 The poll closures may have created confusion among voters
in Hall County, many of whom likely anticipated voting at the same
location they voted in the general election less than two months
earlier.360 Not only is this a ballot access issue, but it is also an issue
regarding the health of marginalized communities. 361 Marginalized
communities are disproportionately more likely to get COVID-19,362
and forcing them to wait in long lines to vote on Election Day further
increased this risk.363
The letter urged Hall County to maintain at least eight early voting
locations so that the county would not violate Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act 364 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.365 Hall County election officials stated that they reduced
the number of early voting sites because they did not have enough poll
workers to operate more early voting sites.366 The organizations that
sent the letter retorted by offering to help provide and train poll
workers if the county had a shortage.367 Hall County did not end up
taking any action in response to this letter.368 The number of early
votes as a percentage of all votes cast in Hall County decreased from
61.3% in the general election to just 38.5% in the runoff elections.369

See id.
See Mansoor, supra note 35.
See id.
See, e.g., Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities
Persist — and in Some Cases Worsen, NPR (Sept. 23, 2020, 1:01 PM),
359.
360.
361.
362.

https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-pandemic-deathsadd-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-some-cases-worsen [https://perma.cc/T9CKWDHE]; Ethnic Minorities Disproportionately Affected by Coronavirus: Study,
REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:57 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-minorities/ethnic-minorities-disproportionately-affected-by-coronavirusstudy-idUSKBN27T03G [https://perma.cc/YZ7J-K6MZ].
363. See Mansoor, supra note 35.
364. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits voting practices or procedures that,
based on the “totality of the circumstance of the local electoral process,” have the
result of denying or diluting a racial or language minority an equal opportunity to
participate in an election. See Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Sept.
11,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-2-voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/UD6X-M5B9] (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982)).
365. See Dec. 16 Letter, supra note 355, at 4.
366. See Mansoor, supra note 35.
367. See id.
368. See Telephone Interview with Michael Pernick, Att’y, NAACP Legal Def.
Fund (Dec. 30, 2020).
369. Compare Georgia Early Voting Statistics, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT (Nov. 5,
2020),
https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/GA.html
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Hall County’s citizens should be able to seek judicial review to
determine whether county policies result in unconstitutional
disenfranchisement. If a court determines that the plaintiffs have a
meritorious claim, the court should be able to intervene and prevent
such unconstitutional actions. However, because Hall County officials
made such decisions within two months of Election Day, a court may
rely on the Purcell principle and merely defer to state officials’
decisions. If state officials know the court will give absolute deference
to the state’s decision, officials can act without oversight and the threat
of litigation will be moot.370 Stressing the proximity of the election so
heavily takes away the greatest weapon in the voting rights advocate’s
arsenal: litigation. 371 There is a hole in voting rights protections
because, under the Purcell principle, courts could refuse to grant
judicial relief for claims regarding unconstitutional election
administration decisions within two months of Election Day, even if
such claims have merit.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the bounds
of the Purcell principle and merged it with deference to state power
over elections and emergency powers.372 The Purcell opinion warned
lower courts about the potential voter confusion caused by court orders
decided close to Election Day.373 The Court then applied the Purcell
principle as a bright-line rule against intervening in elections close to
Election Day. 374 Additionally, the Court has not articulated any
exceptions to the Purcell principle. 375 Without much guidance on
applying the Purcell principle, lower courts, unsurprisingly, do not
apply it uniformly. 376 The fact that neither Justice Kavanaugh nor
Justice Gorsuch went through the traditional factors for staying an
order in Andino or vacating a stay in Wisconsin State Legislature lends
credence to the deduction that the factors are irrelevant when applying
the Purcell principle.377 Lastly, the Court has never defined how close
to an election is too close. For example, the Court has applied the

[https://perma.cc/NJV3-SPMZ], with Georgia Early Voting Statistics — 2021 Senate
Run-Off
Election,
U.S.
ELECTIONS
PROJECT
(Jan.
6,
2020),
https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/GA_RO.html [https://perma.cc/JP9PPZJW].
370. See infra Section III.C.
371. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
372. See supra Section II.B.
373. See supra Section I.A.
374. See supra Section II.A.
375. See supra Sections II.A–B.
376. See supra Section II.C.
377. See supra Section II.B.
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Purcell principle to lower court rulings that arose 61 days before an

election, 378 as well as five days before an election. 379 This veritable
mess of a doctrine leaves a gap in the judicial protection of voting rights
close to elections.
III. THE COMBINATION OF PURCELL AND STATE EMERGENCY
POWERS IS RIPE FOR ABUSE

By strongly relying on the Purcell principle, the Supreme Court is
tying lower courts’ hands and preventing them from providing judicial
relief from unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote. While the
Purcell principle is harmful in the context of ordinary elections, the
additional reliance on the state emergency powers doctrine opens the
door to potential abuse in future elections. The Court should articulate
more explicit boundaries for the Purcell principle and state emergency
powers.
Section III.A points out that reliance on the Purcell principle and
state emergency powers grants considerable power to state legislatures.
It then analyzes the potential for emergency powers to be abused by
state legislators or governors for illegitimate reasons and asserts that
the Supreme Court needs to prevent state governments from
improperly intervening in elections. Section III.B argues that the
Court should clearly articulate the Purcell principle to allow for
consistent application by lower courts. This Section then proposes that
the Court allow plaintiffs to prove that changes to election laws are an
egregious abuse of state emergency powers and create burdens on the
right to vote without valid justification. Section III.C concludes by
analyzing a hypothetical example under both the existing framework
and the proposed framework to demonstrate how it protects against
egregious abuses of state emergency powers.

378. See Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 573 U.S. 988 (2014). The
district court decided Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d
808 (S.D. Ohio 2014), on September 4, 2014, and election day in 2014 was on November
4,
see
Election
Results.
2014,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2014 [https://perma.cc/JG25-AHNV] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2021).
379. See Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 140
S. Ct. 1205 (2020). The district court decided Democratic National Committee v.
Republican National Committee, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952 (W.D. Wis. 2020), on April 2,
2020, and primary election day in Wisconsin was on April 7, 2020, see Wisconsin
Elections, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wisconsin_elections,_2020
[https://perma.cc/GR4Y-SWE8] (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
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A. Fixing the Purcell Principle

James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 43 that “[t]he only restriction
imposed on [the States is] that they shall not exchange republican for
antirepublican Constitutions.”380 To ensure the integrity of elections,
the Court must carve out an exception to the Purcell principle
regarding the potential for egregious abuse of state emergency powers
for undemocratic purposes. In an emergency, courts should protect
against practices and procedures that unconstitutionally burden the
right to vote. State legislatures and executives are more capable of
responding to emergencies like a pandemic, but courts must guarantee
that the responses do not violate the Constitution.
The Purcell principle is incredibly problematic and prevents
consideration of cases on the merits close to elections, leaving plaintiffs
without judicial relief from potential constitutional violations. This
issue is heightened in emergencies when the state has greater
justifications for burdening the right to vote.381 Combining the Purcell
principle with the state emergency powers doctrine allocates
tremendous power to state legislatures to administer elections during
emergencies and ties the courts’ hands in voting rights litigation. 382
State legislatures have the power to create election laws383 and address
emergencies,384 but that power should be subject to judicial review. A
bright-line rule prohibiting judicial review close to Election Day and
complete deference to state emergency powers opens the door to abuse
of state powers. Without a possibility for recourse close to elections,
voters are vulnerable to egregious abuses of state emergency powers.
The Supreme Court views legislative branches as better equipped to
handle public health crises because they are politically accountable to
the people.385 Nevertheless, legislatures may not be fully accountable
if they can rewrite the rules of their own elections without substantive
judicial review close to the election’s date. If a natural disaster, like a
hurricane, 386 or a terrorist attack 387 hits close to Election Day, then
courts may be powerless to prevent voting rights abuses.

380. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison).
381. See supra Section I.C.i.
382. See supra Part II.
383. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 4.
384. See Election Emergencies, supra note 187 and accompanying text.
385. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
386. See supra Section I.C.ii.
387. See supra Section I.C.ii; see also Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a
Presidential Election?, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523, 525 (2005).
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As demonstrated previously, every case close to an election and a
state emergency completely defers to state decisions. 388 The
Constitution grants state legislatures authority to administer elections,
subject to Congressional oversight and judicial review for
constitutional rights violations.389 Ensuring the political accountability
of the decisions made in an emergency is essential to the function of
democracy.390 Allowing an exception to the Purcell principle and state
emergency powers doctrine balances the deference to state legislatures
in making emergency decisions while maintaining fair election
practices.
Historically, the Court has been very deferential to the states during
emergencies, but the Court has stepped in after emergencies to prevent
future egregious abuses of emergency powers.391 Egregious abuses of
emergency powers have consisted of prosecuting civilians in military
tribunals when they were not involved with military service and civilian
courts were operational, thereby depriving them of their constitutional
rights to a trial by jury and due process of law.392 An egregious abuse
of emergency powers in election law, as defined in this Note, involves
using emergency powers to unconstitutionally inject government into
the debate over who should govern through decisions that affect the
right to vote.
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 393 the Court struck down a provision of Arizona’s public
campaign financing system that allowed candidates for state office who
accepted public funding to receive additional public funding when
independent expenditure groups spent money for a privately funded
opponent.394 In its opinion, the Court stated that “‘[l]eveling electoral
opportunities means making and implementing judgments about which
strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an
election’ . . . . And such basic intrusion by the government into the
debate over who should govern goes to the heart of First Amendment
values.”395

388. See supra Parts II.
389. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXVI.
390. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed . . . .”).
391. See supra Section I.B.i.
392. See supra Section I.B.i.
393. 564 U.S. 721 (2011).
394. See id. at 750–55.
395. Id. at 750 (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008)).
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In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 396 the Court
addressed a campaign finance law that restricted how much money a
donor could contribute in total to all political candidates or
committees.397 When it struck down this restriction, the Court said,
“those who govern should be the last people to help decide who should
govern.”398 Concerns over governmental intrusion into the decision as
to who should govern are the same concerns that the Court should have
when states make emergency changes to election laws.
B. Courts Should Limit the Purcell Principle and
State Emergency Powers

The Supreme Court should look back at the framework it created
with the Purcell principle and state emergency powers doctrine to
protect democracy in future emergencies. Currently, the Supreme
Court has not outlined circumstances that could overcome the Purcell
principle.399 Not even a showing of intentional racial discrimination
was enough to overcome the Purcell principle in one case. 400 The
marriage of the Purcell principle and the state emergency powers
doctrine makes judicial relief even more unlikely.401 On the one hand,
the Court is correct: emergencies warrant deference to state
legislatures.402 However, courts must have the power to review such
actions. Suppose that, in response to COVID-19, a state passed an
emergency order stating that only men could vote because there are
fears COVID-19 kills more women than men. This regulation clearly
would violate the Nineteenth Amendment, which states that “the right
. . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . by any State on account
of sex.”403 However, it appears that in this absurd scenario, the Court
would defer to the state emergency powers and the Purcell principle
and refuse to grant judicial relief. This is unacceptable.

396. 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality opinion).
397. See id. at 193–96.
398. See id. at 192.
399. See supra Sections I.A–B; supra Part II.
400. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 698–99 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (enjoining
implementation of voter identification law based on finding of intentional
discrimination), motion to vacate stay denied, 769 F.3d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 2014), motion
to vacate stay denied, 135 S. Ct. 9, 9 (2014) (mem.); see also supra Section I.A.iii.
401. See supra Section II.B.
402. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29–30
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
403. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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The first thing the Court should do is establish clear boundaries for
the Purcell principle and remedy the confusion among lower courts.404
When determining if the Purcell principle applies, the Court should
provide direction on specific considerations regarding the election’s
proximity. The lack of explanation about timing prevents clear
communication to plaintiffs when the Purcell principle applies. 405
Additionally, the importance of the proximity of the election may
differ between cases. 406 For instance, if the deadline for printing
ballots is one month before the election, then any litigation regarding
ballot access for a candidate must take place an adequate amount of
time before printing the ballots. However, if the challenged procedure
is, for example, the deadline for casting or receiving absentee ballots,
then a month out from the election may be ample time to change the
necessary procedures. The Court needs to explain these considerations
to ensure consistent application of the Purcell principle across the
circuits.
Furthermore, the Court must make clear how the Purcell principle
applies in the procedure for analyzing requests for preliminary relief or
stays pending appeal. Currently, lower courts are applying the
principle inconsistently, making it confusing for plaintiffs to litigate.407
If plaintiffs do not know which of the preliminary injunction factors or
Nken factors the principle applies to, then any litigation becomes more
difficult. 408 Additional explanation is needed in order to uniformly
apply the Purcell principle across the circuit courts.
Moreover, the Court must clarify a distinction between courts’
power to overrule election laws and the constraints on that power close
to Election Day. Throughout the pandemic, the Court merged the
Purcell principle with state legislatures’ constitutionally delegated
power to administer elections under Articles I and II of the
Constitution 409 without clearly distinguishing between the two
404. See supra Section II.C.
405. See, e.g., Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Hughs, 976 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2020)
(ruling that plaintiffs misconstrued when the Purcell principle applies because 18 days
before early voting begins is too close to the election).
406. See Kishore v. Whitmer, 972 F.3d 745, 751 (6th Cir. 2020) (applying the Purcell
principle even though election officials gave the court a deadline more than a week
later than when the ruling came down).
407. See supra Section II.C.
408. Compare Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389 (5th Cir. 2020)
(applying the Purcell principle under the “irreparable harm” factor in the analysis of
stay pending appeal), with Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 834 F. App’x 860, 865 (5th Cir.
2020) (applying the Purcell principle under the “likelihood of success on the merits”
factor in the stay analysis).
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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410

This is particularly evident in Justice Gorsuch’s
Wisconsin State Legislature concurrence and Moore dissent when he
used the state election power and the Purcell principle
interchangeably. 411 As a result, lower courts are citing the Purcell
principle as standing for different propositions. 412 Thus, the Court
needs to clarify if the Purcell principle merely prevents orders that
create voter confusion or any orders close to elections.413
Additionally, the Court needs to create an exception to the Purcell
principle to allow courts to analyze whether it will intervene regarding
election decisions close to Election Day, especially in cases of
emergencies. A bright-line rule against interference prevents the
Court from granting judicial relief, even if there are constitutional
violations. Utilizing the traditional frameworks for considering
requests for preliminary relief or granting a stay pending appeal, courts
should add into their analysis specific considerations regarding abuses
of state emergency powers.
If the plaintiff can establish that the challenged procedure
constitutes a burden on the right to vote, then the courts should allow
plaintiffs to argue that the state’s proffered justifications for that
burden are not warranted or are invalid, even in times of an emergency.
In the context of elections, the responses must be done in good faith
and must preserve access to the franchise. The substitution of free and
fair elections with those in which the government injects itself towards
one party is analogous to the substitution of civilian courts with military
tribunals.414 The manipulation of election procedures to help decide
who should govern should be considered an egregious abuse of state
emergency power, and courts must intervene to prevent this.
If plaintiffs can prove either of the following, then courts should
grant the plaintiffs’ requested relief over the justifications of the state.
First, suppose the plaintiff can prove there is direct intent to burden
410. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28–30
(2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reasoning that the district court’s relief was so
extraordinary that “there [is no] precedent for it in 230 years of this Court’s decisions”).
411. See id.; Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46, 48 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(“Such last-minute changes by largely unaccountable bodies, too, invite confusion, risk
altering election outcomes, and in the process threaten voter confidence in the
results.”).
412. Compare Tex. Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 411 (citing the Purcell principle to
say that forcing Texas to implement a procedure against its will constituted irreparable
harm), with Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 618 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing the Purcell
principle to say that the court is “ill-equipped” to override the state legislature’s
decision). See generally supra Section II.C.
413. See supra Section II.D.
414. See supra Section I.B.i.
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the right to vote for voters to favor one candidate, party, or class of
voters and improperly attempt to decide who should govern. In that
case, the court should not immediately defer to the state’s decision.
Rather, the court should consider the egregious abuses of state
emergency power in its decision to intervene in the election.
Statements by government officials or party members regarding the
reasons for implementing changes, or refusing to implement changes,
can be proof of manipulation and abuse of state emergency powers.
Additionally, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the policies or lack
thereof intend to benefit one class of voters to the detriment of
another.
Second, if the plaintiff can prove that the implemented policies, or
the refusal to implement policies, burden the right to vote while serving
no rational purpose or do not further the state’s proffered interest, then
equitable relief should be granted to the plaintiff. While a high bar to
meet, this burden of proof provides a way for plaintiffs to surmount the
combination of the Purcell principle and state emergency powers
doctrine. When the use of state emergency power injects government
into the debate as to who should govern,415 then courts should strike it
down. Allowing an exception to the Purcell principle and state
emergency powers doctrine, although intended to be rarely granted,
allows courts to protect against egregious abuses of state power.
C. Analyzing the Georgia 2022 Election Hypothetical Under the
Egregious Abuse of State Emergency Power Framework

Consider the following example of a hypothetical 2022 gubernatorial
election in Georgia to demonstrate the implications of the Purcell
principle and the state emergency powers doctrine. Joe Biden won
Georgia by a razor-thin margin in the 2020 presidential election, 416
which results in a hotly contested 2022 gubernatorial election. In 2020,
President Biden had narrowly beat out President Trump’s lead in
Georgia due primarily to absentee ballots,417 and Democratic voters

415. Cf. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (holding
that campaign finance regulations that pursue objectives other than the preventing
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance impermissibly inject government “into the
debate over who should govern” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 750 (2011))).
416. See Georgia Presidential Election Results 2020, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021, 1:15
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-elections/georgia-president-results
[https://perma.cc/VC8M-TBK3].
417. See Stephanie Saul, Biden Is Closing the Gap on Trump in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/04/us/politics/biden-is-closing-thegap-on-trump-in-georgia.html [https://perma.cc/3V96-YFXE].
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were much more likely to vote absentee than Republican voters.418 In
the 2022 election, incumbent Republican Governor Brian Kemp is
running for reelection.419
Imagine that a month and a half before the 2022 election, a massive
hurricane strikes the east coast, devastating Georgia and destroying
many of the planned polling places for the upcoming elections. In
response to the emergency, Georgia’s emergency statute grants
Governor Kemp power to suspend regulatory statutes, including
election laws.420 Governor Kemp publicly states Georgia will not have
enough poll workers and resources to open new polling sites in every
county and thus will not open new sites in selected counties. Although
the Governor leaves this out of the public statement, the only counties
with new poll sites are ones in which President Trump won at least 60%
of the vote in 2020. 421 Not only that, but the Governor says that
Georgia will only give out and count absentee ballots from these
counties and does not have the resources to administer and count all
the absentee ballots. Therefore, it will not disseminate no-excuse
absentee ballots or allow displacement from the hurricane to be used
as an excuse. 422 As a result, Georgia voters in densely populated,
heavily Democratic counties — such as Fulton, Gwinnett, Cobb,
Chatham, and Dekalb — and competitive counties like Houston and
Lowndes have very few polling places and no other viable alternative
to vote in the wake of the hurricane.
These decisions inflame voting rights groups across Georgia, who
sue in federal court for a preliminary injunction and writ of mandamus,
forcing the Governor to open new polling locations in these counties
and allow all voters to cast absentee ballots. A federal district court in
Georgia grants the preliminary injunction on the grounds that these
restrictions violate voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under the Anderson-Burdick test.423 Its injunction forces the state to
418. Almost 850,000 Georgia absentee voters voted for President Biden compared
to about 450,000 for President Trump. See Christopher Alston, Georgia’s Absentee
Voting Policies That Benefited Democrats Were Created by Republicans, WABE
(Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.wabe.org/absentee-voting-policies-in-georgia-thatbenefited-democrats-were-originally-created-by-republicans/
[https://perma.cc/8CUA-43U4].
419. See Brian Kemp, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Brian_Kemp
[https://perma.cc/G9QS-YNW5] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
420. See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (West 2014); see also Election Emergencies,
supra note 187.
421. See Georgia Presidential Election Results 2020, supra note 416.
422. Cf. King, supra note 25 (discussing an attempt by Georgia’s Governor to restrict
access to absentee ballots during the COVID-19 pandemic due to a lack of resources).
423. See supra Section I.A.
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accept absentee ballots for all voters and open one new polling place
per 10,000 residents in each county that did not have reopened poll
sites. The Eleventh Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Wisconsin State Legislature,424 stays the district court’s injunction.
The plaintiffs then appeal to the Supreme Court, which refuses to
vacate the stay and reiterates its framework, combining the Purcell
principle and the state emergency powers doctrine. Since the
legislature acted with emergency power due to the hurricane and the
election is now less than a month away, the Court refuses to intervene.
The Court cites its previous emergency election law cases425 and says it
is not the place of the Court to second-guess decisions of the politically
accountable branches of state governments.
Consequently, on the day of the election, hundreds of thousands of
voters displaced by the hurricane have to wait all day to vote on
Election Day. Many are unable to vote due to excessively long lines.
Moreover, election officials reject hundreds of thousands of absentee
ballots for not falling within the valid excuses. The limitation of polling
places is particularly burdensome in Atlanta, where several counties
have more than half a million residents but only one poll site. 426
Georgia’s most populous counties are heavily made up of Black
Americans and vote overwhelmingly Democratic.427 As a result, these
restrictions disenfranchise thousands of voters, particularly
Democrats. The election results in a landslide victory for the
incumbent Republican Governor Kemp, who first enacted such
restrictive policies.
This hypothetical demonstrates the extent to which reliance on the
Purcell principle and the state emergency powers doctrine allow for
abuse of state emergency powers close to elections.
During
emergencies, voters may receive no relief from blatant attempts to
restrict access to the ballot, even when there are clear partisan
motivations behind them. The Court should maintain limitations on
that power to ensure free and fair elections. By foregoing any judicial
review close to elections, the Supreme Court is abdicating its primary

424. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020); see also

supra Section II.B.ii.
425. See supra Part II.
426. See
Georgia
Counties

by
Population,
GA.
DEMOGRAPHICS,
https://www.georgia-demographics.com/counties_by_population
[https://perma.cc/MY8G-9VMZ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2021).
427. See David Weigel, How Votes Shifted in the Six Political States of Georgia,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
8,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/politics/georgia-senate-politicalgeography/ [https://perma.cc/BY8K-6H6R].
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responsibility: protecting U.S. citizens against violations of their
constitutional rights.
When analyzing this hypothetical within the new framework
outlined in Section III.B, the judicial analysis changes. After a
hurricane, state emergency powers take effect and increase the state’s
power to implement changes to election laws.428 In the suit challenging
the relocation and reopening of polling places in predominantly white,
Republican-dominated counties and the refusal to accept absentee
ballots from those displaced by the hurricane, the plaintiffs can prove
an egregious abuse of state power.429
First, the plaintiffs must prove that the changes — or lack thereof —
to election laws burden their right to vote.430 Then, the plaintiffs must
show that the use of state power was egregious by injecting the
government into the debate as to who should govern. If the plaintiffs
can show that the state has enough poll workers, in contrast to the
Governor’s claim, to open new polling locations in the affected
counties, then the state’s justification for burdening the right to vote is
suspect. The state may argue that it did not have the resources to open
them due to the hurricane. However, the plaintiffs may prove that the
state did not allocate its resources proportionately, concentrating them
in certain counties, and that it has access to more resources than it is
employing. Proving this demonstrates that the state is improperly
abusing its emergency powers and inequitably facilitating the right to
vote in the gubernatorial election.
Moreover, the plaintiffs could argue that opening new polling places
only in counties that voted for President Trump by 60% demonstrates
an improper abuse of state emergency power. The plaintiffs may argue
that the primary reason to open new polling places in only those
counties is to promote the Governor’s electoral prospects.431 Had the
government spread them out in proportion to the population in each
county, this would have facilitated voting across the state. As a result,
the inequitable distribution of polling places and refusal to employ
enough poll workers to service the other counties serves no rational
purpose and are not explained by the Governor’s justification.

428. See supra Section I.B.
429. See supra Section III.B.
430. See supra Section III.B.
431. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (“[T]he Ohio laws before us give
the two old, established parties a decided advantage over any new parties struggling
for existence and thus place substantially unequal burdens on both the right to vote
and the right to associate.”).
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Furthermore, the State’s argument that it cannot administer noexcuse absentee ballots because it lacks the resources to do so leaves
thousands of voters without a viable alternative for voting. If the
plaintiff shows that the state has the resources to implement this
procedure, this lends credence to their argument. Additionally, if the
plaintiff can demonstrate that they, along with many other voters, will
have no other viable alternative to vote in the election due to the
refusal to open new polling places in several counties, this furthers their
argument. Moreover, if the plaintiffs can prove that not only does the
state have enough resources to implement no-excuse absentee voting,
but also that not doing so would serve to inject the government into the
debate over who should govern, then the court should provide the
plaintiffs relief.
In this hypothetical, the changes to election law through emergency
powers prevented the free exercise of the franchise and a fair election.
The Governor’s actions were not justified by his proffered justifications
and improperly injected government into the debate as to who should
govern. The inhibition of a democratic election constitutes an
egregious abuse of state emergency powers over election law, which
overcomes the application of Purcell and the state emergency powers
doctrine in an emergency proceeding.
If the Court does not formulate a method for a new framework for
evaluating Purcell and state emergency powers, then this scenario
could happen in the near future, and courts would have no way to
prevent impermissible, undemocratic actions. The exception for
egregious abuses of state emergency powers is the only way to balance
both the states’ compelling interests in managing election emergencies
against access to the franchise and fairness of elections. The Court
should ensure political accountability through the maintenance of free
and fair elections.
CONCLUSION

The fear of potentially catching a deadly virus while voting
engendered a profound change in election processes and procedures
throughout the United States. Numerous lawsuits arose trying to
ensure voters’ safety while enabling access to the ballot in the face of
COVID-19.432 The Court tried to leave decisions about voter safety up
to state legislatures because they are politically accountable and have

432. See Election Litigation: COVID-19 and Emergency Election Litigation, supra
note 42.
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the expertise to deal with emergencies. 433 However, the Court’s
reliance on the Purcell principle and deference to state emergency
powers allow unconstitutional burdens on the right to vote to continue
without consideration of cases on the merits. 434 Without a way to
overcome the potential for bad actors to abuse the state legislatures’
power over emergency election administration, voters may have no
way to hold elected officials accountable in an emergency. 435 This
framework aims not to subject every state legislature and executive
decision regarding elections during an emergency to judicial review. It
is merely to provide a backstop against those “[w]icked men, ambitious
of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law”436 from abusing
their emergency powers.

433.
434.
435.
436.

See Part II.
See supra Parts II, III.
See supra Part III.
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 125 (1866).
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Cobb County Advance Voting Sites437

437. Dec. 7 Letter, supra note 28, at 4.
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